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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
The collapse of the communist regimes in Central Europe in the 1990’s created a 
strategic problem for the transition from a command economy to a market economy. The 
main goal of economic reforms was to rationalize the allocation of resources, privatize 
state owned enterprises, liberalize trade, deregulate prices, and lower protection but also 
reduce public expenditures and increase revenue. Each of these countries had to face a 
dilemma of what to choose, either a radical strategy of reforms with a rapid decline in 
consumption and early recovery or a gradual strategy with a moderate decline in 
consumption and a later recovery. 1  
Privatization and private sector development have played an important role in the 
transition period of the Visegrad countries2, which were ranked among the most 
industrialized and economically developed countries of the former Soviet block. 
Privatization has been not only the most observed part of the stabilization and 
transformation process but also the most complicated part of this process. These countries 
did not have much experience on how to quickly and efficiently privatize almost the 
entire economy.    
1. Starting Position 
Privatization was not very well received in the beginning in the former 
Czechoslovakia 3. The state sector in Czechoslovakia comprised more than 98% of the 
entire economy.4 In contrast, the private sector was larger in neighboring Poland or 
Hungary. The Czechoslovak communist regime was not inclined towards private 
                                                 
1 See Adam Przeworski, “The Political Dynamics of Economic Reform,” Democracy and the Market: 
Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), pp. 136-187.  
2 After the disintegration of the COMECON and of the Warsaw Pact, leaders of the former 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland established the Visegrad group at a summit in Visegrad in February 
15, 1991. They affirmed that they would cooperate in matters of common interest, which led later to the 
establishment of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) to encourage trade and reduce 
tariff barriers.  
3 The political development led to the split of the former Czechoslovakia in 1993 and the 
establishment of the Czech and Slovak Republics.  
4 See Nemat Shafik, “Making a Market: Mass Privatization in the Czech and Slovak Republics,” 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank, Policy Research Paper No. 1231, 1993, p. 1. 
2 
ownership, and did not create the foundations for the private sector until 1988. Therefore, 
the Czechoslovak post-communist government had to start almost from scratch. The state 
had to sell or transfer most of its productive assets.  
2. Importance of Privatization 
It is widely recognized that the privatization5 of state assets is one of the key 
elements of reforms during the transition from a command economy to a market 
economy.6 Privatization, which is one of the key elements of the Washington 
Consensus 7, became a symbol of structural change in the post communist countries. The 
most important explanation for the support of privatization in the former centrally 
planned economies is improved efficiency, performance and corporate governance of 
enterprises. The main claim for the transfer of ownership from state hands to private 
hands is that privately owned enterprises are more efficient and profitable than state 
owned enterprises. Evidence suggests that reforms such as price deregulation, market 
liberalization and the use of incentives coupled with privatization are more effective.8 
Thus, privatization is not only the most observed part of the stabilization and 
transformation process but also the most complicated part of this process.  
3. Privatization Goals 
Prince Waterhouse described six main goals of privatization. The first goal is to 
raise revenue for the state from the transfer of ownership. The second aim is to improve 
the economic efficiency of privatized enterprises. The third purpose is to reduce the 
                                                 
5 Privatization is broadly defined as “the deliberate sale by a government of state owned assets or 
assets to private agents. “ See William L. Megginson and Jeffrey M. Netter, “From State to Market: A 
Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXIX (June 2001) 
p. 321.  
6 The statistical evidence provided by Fisher and Sahay confirms the importance of privatization as 
one of the key elements in the reform process. The authors found that stabilization policies and structural 
reforms, particularly privatization, contributed to growth recovery in transition economies.  They concluded 
that the faster the pace of reforms, the quicker the recovery and the greater the growth. See Fisher Stanley 
and Sahay Ratna,  “The Transition Economies after Ten Years,” Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Inc., Working Paper No. 7664, 2000.  
7 Williamson (1990) classified a list of policy actions known as the Washington Consensus: Actions 
based on stabilization-cum-adjustment policies recommended by the Bretton Woods organizations and U.S. 
economic officials. It emphasizes the need for prudent macroeconomic and financial policies, unified and 
competitive exchange rates, trade and financial liberalization, privatization, and deregulation. See Joachim 
Ahrens, Toward a Post-Washington Consensus: The Importance of Governance Structures in Less 
Developed Countries and Economies in Transition. Available [Online]: 
<http://www.sigov.si/zmar/apublici/iib/iib0400/08-ahren.pdf> [2 February 2002], p. 5. 
8 See William L. Megginson and Jeffrey M. Netter, “From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical 
Studies on Privatization,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXIX (June 2001) p. 380.  
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government’s involvement in the economy.  The fourth objective is to broaden the 
enterprise ownership structure. The fifth goal is create a competitive environment. The 
final objective is to subordinate state owned enterprises to free market discipline.9  
4. Visegrad Countries  
The privatization experience from the Visegrad countries is not straightforward. 
The Czech Republic implemented radical reforms and a rapid pace of privatization by 
using a unique mass privatization method. In addition, the Czech government decided to 
distribute a significant part of state owned assets for free. In contrast, Poland and 
Hungary favored a gradual pace for transition, more moderate privatization methods and 
the distribution of state assets for free played a less important role in the privatization 
strategy.  
B. OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this thesis is to test an important question: was 
privatization in the Czech Republic in the transformation period from the Soviet style 
economy to a market economy a success or failure. The importance of answering this 
question arises because privatization was the keystone for stabilization and 
transformation of command economies in Central and Easter European countries. 
Privatization played a significant role as the private sector was missing or played an 
insignificant role in the Soviet style economy. Privatization was not only the most 
observed part of the stabilization and transformation process but also the most 
complicated part of this process.  
The Czech government’s top priority was to quickly privatize the state sector. The 
major problem was how to quickly privatize a large number of state enterprises. In 
addition, the democratic government decided to use new methods of privatization. A 
unique method of privatization was implemented to speed up privatization and distribute 
a significant part of state owned property to the citizens. The pace was more important 
than moral arguments because leading political forces decided to undertake this task 
radically. In contrast to the rapid and radical privatization in the Czech Republic, Poland 
and Hungary used more moderate methods of privatization.  
                                                 
9 See William L. Megginson and Jeffrey M. Netter, “From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical 
Studies on Privatization,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXIX (June 2001) p. 30. 
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This goal of this thesis is to examine if the new method of privatization used in 
the Czech Republic was really the “Czech miracle” or a disappointment, and in addition, 
examine whether the privatization methods used in the Czech Republic were faster and 
more efficient than those followed in Hungary and Poland. The next objective is to 
review the current information known concerning the privatization process in the Czech 
Republic, and the privatization methods used in Poland and Hungary. A comparison will 
then be done on the pace and methods of privatization used in the Czech Republic with 
those used in Poland and Hungary. A summary of the views concerning the success or 
failure of privatization in the Czech Republic will be presented. Then, a comparative 
analysis is provided on how privatization methods affected macroeconomic development 
in these countries. Moreover, an assessment of the importance of the pace of the 
transition period and how the pace of privatization affected its credibility will be given. 
Finally, it will be determined if the new method of privatization used in the Czech 
Republic was really a miracle or a disappointment. 
The purpose of this thesis in dealing with the results of the privatization methods 
used in the Visegrad countries is threefold. First, it presents and discusses the basic facts 
about the privatization process in the Czech Republic because a unique privatization way 
was implemented to speed up privatization and distribute a significant part of state owned 
property to the citizens. Second, it introduces the privatization methods used in other 
Visegrad countries and compares the pace of privatization among them and reveals what 
is still needed for further privatization. Third, it provides a macroeconomic comparative 
analysis of the Visegrad countries by focusing on the last decade in order to reveal to 
what extent the Czech privatization approach was successful or not. 
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis attempts to answer the following questions:  
· Can privatization in the transformation period from the Soviet style 
economy to a market economy in the Czech Republic be described as a 
success or failure? 
· What is voucher privatization and the reason for its implementation in the 
Czech Republic? 
· Which political forces affected the selection of the privatization methods 
and what was the reasoning behind it? 
5 
· Is it possible to ascertain how the newly created voucher funds affected 
corporate governance? 
· What were the drawbacks of voucher privatization? 
· What kinds of privatization methods were used in the Visegrad countries? 
· How did privatization methods affect the pace of privatization? 
· What was the extent of the state property distribution to citizens in the 
Visegrad countries and how was the equality of distribution affected by 
the privatization methods?    
· How did the privatization methods affect macroeconomic development in 
the Visegrad countries? 
· How much is still left to privatize in the Visegrad countries at the end of 
the millennium? 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The focus of this study is on the Czech experience because it represents an 
attempt to accelerate the privatization process by adopting a voucher privatization 
method in one of the strongest institutional settings among transition countries from the 
former Soviet block. The study examines what privatization methods were used in other 
Visegrad countries. This study explores what was achieved in privatization in Visegrad 
countries and compares the achieved macroeconomic developments. In addition, it tries 
to find and discuss the positive and negative aspects of voucher privatization.  
This study does not endeavor to address the entire scope of concerns and criticism 
of the implemented privatization methods. It does not examine in depth the privatization 
process in Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic. Rather, this study focuses on a 
unique privatization method and its implementation. The goal is to review the 
achievements and drawbacks of privatization in the Czech Republic because the extent of 
privatization was greater there than in other Visegrad countries.  
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate to what extent the government objectives and 
public expectations were fulfilled. Understanding the Czech privatization example is 
important for the future as well as being important to those who would like to follow this 
example. 
The majority of studies about privatization and macroeconomic development are 
restricted by the limited availability of primary sources of information. Also, the quality 
6 
of data available for comparative analysis is limited. It is difficult to obtain current data at 
the same time for a group of countries. Researchers mainly draw from secondary data 
sources. However, the future promises improvements in the case of Visegrad countries. 
Why? They are forced by the European Union to release more information to the public 
and make the institutional settings more transparent.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
The overall purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, it is to analyze the success or 
failure of the Czech privatization example by examining the privatization process itself. 
The goal is to investigate to what extent the Czech government was able to fulfill its 
privatization objectives. Second, it is to conduct a macroeconomic comparative analysis 
of Visegrad countries focusing on the last decade to reveal to what extent the Czech 
privatization approach was successful or not. The information for this research is drawn 
from a literature search of books, journal articles, working papers, and other library 
materials relevant to the subject.  
The first approach used in this thesis is the descriptive analysis of the 
privatization process in the Czech Republic and methods implemented with the main 
focus on the coupon privatization method during the transition to a market economy.  In 
addition, a descriptive analysis of privatization methods used in other Visegrad countries 
is provided. The second approach used in this study is to conduct a macroeconomic 
comparative analysis of the Visegrad countries. The comparative analysis includes a 
comparison of macroeconomic indicators such as economic growth, inflation, 
unemployment, equity and foreign investment. It also encompasses a comparison of 
elements of free market development such as free trade, price liberalization, deregulation 
and corporate governance. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This chapter has presented an overview of research questions and explains the 
purpose of the study. Chapter II provides an overview of the privatization process in the 
Czech Republic and mainly focuses on the unique coupon privatization method. Chapter 
III briefly discusses the privatization methods used in Hungary and Poland. Chapter IV 
provides a macroeconomic comparative analysis of Visegrad countries in order to reveal 
7 
to what extent the pace of privatization affected macroeconomic development in these 
countries. Chapter V gives an overview of the current evaluations of the Czech 
privatization approach. Chapter VI summarizes the findings of the thesis and derives 
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II. PRIVATIZATION IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC  
The disintegration of the communist regime in 1989 caused the strategic problem 
of transitioning from a command economy to a market economy. The main goal of 
economic reforms was to rationalize the allocation of resources, privatize state owned 
enterprises, liberalize trade, deregulate prices, and lower tariffs. In addition, the plan was 
to reduce public expenditures and at the same time increase tax revenues. The dilemma 
was whether to chose between a radical strategy of reforms leading to a rapid decline in 
consumption and an early recovery or a gradual strategy leading to a moderate decline in 
consumption and a later recovery. 10 
The first part of this chapter presents a brief overview of where the former 
Czechoslovakia began to rebuild itself after the fall of the communist regime. Next, the 
people who shaped the transition strategy and its basic principles are discussed. The goal 
of privatization is also reviewed.  
The second part of the chapter presents an overview of the privatization programs 
used in the Czech Republic. The restitution program is described followed by a summary 
of the small scale privatization method. Finally, the large scale privatization program is 
described.  
The third part of the chapter focuses on the unique coupon privatization method11, 
which occurred in two waves, and had a significant impact on the political sustainability 
of radical reform. First, the voucher privatization process is described followed by a 
discussion of the privatization projects. Next, information about the first wave of voucher 
privatization is introduced, and the results of the second wave are then summarized. The 
last part of the chapter describes the investment privatization funds and their importance.  
 
 
                                                 
10 See Adam Przeworski, “The Political Dynamics of Economic Reform.” Democracy and the Market: 
Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), pp. 136 -187.  
11 In this paper I use the coupon method and voucher method interchangeably.  
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A. TRANSITION  
Privatization was not favorably received when it was first introduced in the 
former Czechoslovakia12. The Czechoslovak economy had been almost entirely owned 
by the state.13 Firms were either directly or indirectly state owned through state owned 
banks. Shafik insists that 98% of the assets were in state hands and private property rights 
did not exist.14 On the other hand, however, income distribution was more equal, and 
inflation, unemployment and the external debt were lower than in Hungary and Poland. 
The party system was relatively stable. When the Czechoslovak economy started over it 
was often claimed to be the best as far as foreign indebtedness was concerned.15 For a 
long time, Czechoslovakia was traditionally oriented towards manufacturing, had one of 
the highest living standards of the former Soviet block and had very low-income 
inequality. 16  
The communist regime was inclined to state ownership, and did not become 
involved in the private sector until 1988. The Czechoslovak post-communist government 
had to start almost from scratch. For example, the state had to sell or transfer most of its 
productive assets. By all accounts, the start was slow. In mid-1992, more than 95% of the 
economy was still controlled by the state.17 The key to the transformation was coupon 
privatization that involved every adult citizen. The idea was to offer each an incentive to 
own property directly. Moreover, the goal was to cause these property owners to support 
privatization, and by doing so, create political and economic stability.    
 
                                                 
12 The political development led to a split of the former Czechoslovakia in 1993 and the establishment 
of the Czech and Slovak Republic. 
13 In 1989, the private sector was employing only 1.2% of the work force. See “The Current State of 
the Czech Privatization”, Czech Business and Trade, February 19, 2002, Available [Online]: 
http://www.mpo.cz/gc/0003/page0012.htm. 
14 Nemat Shafik, “Information and Price Determination under Mass Privatization,” Washington D.C.: 
The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1305, 1994, p. 22. 
15 Václav Klaus, “A Perspective on Economic Transition in Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe,” 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank, Keynote Address, The World Bank Annual conference on 
development economics, 1990, p. 14. 
16 John Nellis, “External Advisors & Privatization in Transition Economies,” Washington D.C.: The 
World Bank, Working Paper No. 3, February 2002, p. 22.  
17 Carol Graham, “Voucher Privatization in the Czech Republic,“ Private Markets for Public Goods: 
Raising the Stakes in Economic Reform, Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, 1998, p. 217. 
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1. Liberal Transition Strategy 
The most important figure in shaping the strategy of the economic transformation 
in Czechoslovakia was Václav Klaus, the Minister of Finance in the first elected 
government coalition, and the Czech Prime Minister after the 1992 elections. His 
rhetorical commitment to free market principles was virtually absolute. He fought for 
what he repeatedly called a “market without adjectives” – not a “socialist market 
economy” or a “mixed” economy, but a full-blown free market economy.”18 The pace at 
which this happened was more important than moral arguments.  
Václav Klaus preferred a transition from a centrally planned economy to a market 
economy. He was strongly against the introduction of any combination of a centrally 
planned and market economy. The goal was a rapid transition that would initially create a 
short period of zero or negative growth rate followed shortly thereafter by a positive 
growth rate. The focal points of the transition strategy were privatization, price 
liberalization and foreign trade liberalization. 19 
There was a general agreement among Czechoslovak economists and politicians 
concerning the basic principles of economic transition. The basic principles for a 
transition from a command economy to a market economy were the fast dismantling of 
the administrative system of central planning, price liberalization, liberalization of 
foreign trade and exchange rates, restrictive fiscal and monetary policies to prevent 
hyperinflation and privatization of an important part of state controlled assets.20  
The main conflict was between the liberal right wing economists led by Václav 
Klaus, Tomas Ježek, Vladimír Dlouhý and the left-center wing led by Valtr Komárek, 
Miloš Zeman and Ota Šik. Their main disagreement concerned the method and the pace 
                                                 
18 Oskar Krejcí, “Economic Transition,” Czechoslovak National Interests: A Historical Survey of 
Czechoslovak National Interests and Relations on the Demise of Czechoslovak Communism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 180. 
19 Václav Klaus was appointed on December 10, 1989 as the first Minister of Finance of the Czech 
and Slovak Federal Republic after the Velvet revolution. In 1990, shortly after his appointment, he 
hammered out a provisional budget for fiscal year 1991, followed by a new budget with the goal of 
transforming the former budget from a deficit to a surplus. Václav Klaus, “A Perspective on Economic 
Transition in Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe.” Washington D.C.: The World Bank, Keynote Address, 
The World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1990, pp. 13-18.  
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of economic transition. The former group supported rapid privatization and the rapid 
introduction of a free market. In contrast, the later group favored gradual privatization 
with the government playing an active role in the economy. Valtr Komárek supported a 
slower pace of privatization because he saw “shock therapy” as the killer of reforms. The 
President of the former Czechoslovakia, Václav Havel, supported a third method of 
transition based on the example of the Asian Tigers. This transformation was based on 
protectionism in domestic markets, and supporting exports in areas with a comparative 
advantage. 
Václav Klaus defeated this form of transformation. In 1991, the rapid course of 
actions was implemented. In contrast, there was no disagreement about the rapid pace of 
small privatization. 21 Under pressure from other political parties, Klaus agreed to the 
restitution of property nationalized by the Communists after 1948. The reason for this 
limitation was to make the privatization process faster and easier to accomplish. Sensitive 
enterprises known as “family jewels” remained in state hands. The basic procedures for 
privatization were outlined in law in February 1991. Each adult citizen had the right to 
purchase a voucher book.  
2. Privatization Goals  
Prince Waterhouse described six main goals of privatization. The first is to raise 
revenue for the state from the transfer of ownership. The second is to improve the 
economic efficiency of privatized enterprises. The third is to reduce the government’s 
involvement in the economy.  The fourth is to broaden the enterprise ownership structure. 
The fifth is to create a competitive environment. The final goal is to subordinate state 
owned enterprises to free market discipline.22   
The first main objective of Czech privatization was to attain ownership 
transformation and gain pubic support for privatization. The Czechoslovak public did not 
                                                 
20 Oldrich Kyn, “Market with Vouchers and Investment Funds,” Prague: CERGE, 1992, Available 
[Online]: <http://econc10.bu.edu/okyn/Okpers/Vouchers/vouchers1.htm>, February 19, 2002. 
21 Ibid., p. 2.  
22 See William L. Megginson and Jeffrey M. Netter, “From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical 
Studies on Privatization,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXIX (June 2001) p. 30. 
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immediately support a Western style parliamentary democracy with a free market.23 The 
second reason for supporting privatization was to improve efficiency, performance and 
the governance of enterprises. The main claim is that privately owned enterprises are 
more efficient and profitable than state owned enterprises. The next objectives were to 
prevent the domination of foreigners or the domination of the communist nomenclature in 
the privatization process.24 In contrast, the objective of privatization was not to address 
issues such as regional development, unemployment and fiscal shortfalls.  
The importance of the pace and equality of privatization led to the voucher 
method. The major priorities became the need for rapid ownership transformation, 
preparation for privatization, limited involvement of the government in companies and a 
quick sale of state owned enterprises. In contrast, the sale price and collecting the revenue 
were less important. Why was the pace so important? It was important in order to reduce 
the time in which the firms would be in limbo without effective possessors. There were 
two reasons why political parties were afraid. The first was that foreign investors would 
outbid domestic investors whose total private savings amounted to only about 300 billion 
CZK in 1991. The second was that the wealthier citizens would benefit more as 60% of 
households had savings of less than 20,000 CZK. Equal public participation was 
politically crucial in order to avoid the perception that only the wealthier citizens and 
foreigners were benefiting from privatization. 25 
B. PRIVATIZATION METHODS  
Privatization in the former Czechoslovakia was accomplished under the three 
programs of restitution, small scale privatization and mass privatization and direct sale. 
The restitution program was designed to return assets nationalized after February 1948 
under communist rule. The small scale privatization focused on small business units that 
were sold at public auctions. The main privatization program was mass privatization in 
                                                 
23 Based on the public opinion poll from December 1989, only 22% of the population favored 
wholesale privatization of industry and 13% supported privatization of agriculture. The median orientation 
was favored by 47% of citizens while 45% of the citizens still wanted to follow reformed socialism, and 
only 3% favored capitalism. Carol Skalnik Leff, “The Velvet Revolution of 1989 and the Politics of 
Democratization,” The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation versus State (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1997), p. 83. 
24 Carol Graham, “Voucher Privatization in the Czech Republic,” Private Markets for Public Goods: 
Raising the Stakes in Economic Reform (Washington, D. C: Brooking Institution Press, 1998), p. 217. 
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which ownership rights of a large number of enterprises were transferred from the state to 
private hands.  
A special Board for the Temporary Administration of the State Property and Its 
Privatization under the Ministry of Finance prepared the fundamental concept of the 
privatization scheme and organized the privatization process.26 Its head, Dušan Tríska, 
was the primary creator of coupon privatization. He stressed the importance of the pace 
in order for privatization to succeed.27 The privatization process was divided into two 
waves. The first wave included commercialization of the state owned enterprises that 
meant the creation of state joint stock companies with a given number of shares in the 
crucial part of the economy. The second wave covered the sale of shares to the public 
through auctions. The voucher privatization scheme anticipated the distribution of a large 
part of state assets for free to the public in the form of vouchers and a quick 
transformation of property rights.28  
1. Restitution to Original Owners  
The restitution method of privatization focused on the return of specific property 
seized by force after 25 February 1948. This restriction meant that most industrial assets 
were excluded from restitution. 29 Also, financial assets, company shares and Nazi 
property rewards were excluded from restitution. Small scale restitution encompassed the 
return of about 80,000 buildings to include hotels, pubs and shops nationa lized after 
1955. Large scale restitution encompassed only small assets since only 13.7% of 
productive assets remained in private hands by February 1948.30  
                                                 
25 Nemat Shafik, “Making a Market: Mass Privatization in the Czech and Slovak Republics,” 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank, Policy Research Paper No. 1231, 1993, pp. 2-3. 
26 Václav Klaus, “A Perspective on Economic Transition in Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe.” 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank, Keynote Address, The World Bank Annual conference on 
development economics, 1990, p. 17.  
27 John Nellis, “External Advisors & Privatization in Transition Economies,” Washington D.C.: The 
World Bank, Working Paper No. 3, February 2002, p. 25.  
28 Václav Klaus, “A Perspective on Economic Transition in Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe.” 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank, Keynote Address, The World Bank Annual Conference on 
Development Economics, 1990, p. 17.  
29 By February 1948, 82.3% of Czechoslovak capital assets were nationalized and private sector 
accounted for 33.4% of total national product. See John S. Earle, Roman Frydman, Andrzej Rapaczynski 
and Joel Turkewitz, “Small Privatization: The Transformation of Retail trade and Consumer services in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland”. New York: Central European University Press, 1994, p. 54.  
30 Eva Marikova, “Voucher Privatization in Czechoslovakia,” Comparative Economic Studies, 
Flushing: Fall 1993; Leeds, p. 2.  
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The restitution law was linked to 25 February 1948. Properties nationalized before 
that date were excluded from privatization that created a controversy. The German 
Government tried to push the Czech Government to revise that date and tried to open 
discussions about the claims of Sudeten Germans. Around three million Sudeten 
Germans were forced to leave Czechoslovakia after World War II. President Vaclav 
Havel expressed his regret concerning the treatment of Germans at the end of war. 
However, a revision of the dates by the Czech parliament was not on its agenda. 
The restitution described above was not meant to correct every existing mistake. 
Instead, it was designed to bring restitution into the spirit of the law. Claims prior to 1948 
and those who were not Czech citizens were excluded from restitution. During the 
restitution process, many claims for numerous shops, restaurants, hotels, workshops, 
houses, land parcels and small factories were eligible for restitution. The applicants 
submitted their claims to organizations that had the property in question in their custody. 
If a return was not possible, the former owners received monetary compensation in the 
form of shares in an investment restitution fund. Over 100,000 items, mainly residential 
houses31 and approximately 17,000-20,000 trade and service establishments have been 
returned to former owners or their heirs.32  
2. Small Scale Privatization through Public Auctions  
The small scale privatization method was applied to small size business units33 in 
the form of public auctions. The number of auctioned units in a tender reached 21,768 by 
the end of 1992. The total opening price for these units reached 25.1 billion CZK and 
total sales revenues reached about 31.1 billion CZK.34 On average, the selling price 
                                                 
31 John S. Earle, Roman Frydman, Andrzej Rapaczynski and Joel Turkewitz, “Small Privatization: The 
Transformation of Retail Trade and Consumer Services in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland”. New 
York: Central European University Press, 1994, p. 57.  
32 John S. Earle. Roman Frydman, Andrzej Rapaczynski and Joel Turkewitz, “Eastern European 
Experience with Small Scale Privatization,” CFS Discussion Paper, No. 104, New York: The World Bank, 
1999, p. 16. 
33 Shafik defined the size of enterprise as small (book value under CZK 100,000,000), medium (book 
value more than CZK 100,000,000 and less than 500, 000,000), and large (book value greater than CZK 
500,000,000). Nemat Shafik, “Making a Market: Mass Privatization in the Czech and Slovak Republics,” 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank, Policy Research Paper No. 1231, 1993, p. 54. 
34 Ibid., p. 53.  
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exceeded the opening price by 51%.35 Although the auctions offered an equal opportunity 
for all participants, the successful bidders were mainly the former communist 
nomenclature, who had enriched themselves under the communist regime.  
The starting price at the public auctions was set at one-half of the book value. The 
first wave was only open to domestic investors. Foreign investors were only allowed to 
participate in the second wave. The average final price as a percent of the average starting 
price reached 149%. Only 28% of the items represented full privatization. In 72% of 
cases the winners acquired equipment, inventory and received the right to rent the unit for 
a fixed term.36 The program was successfully finished at the end of 1993. The small scale 
privatization proceeded faster than restitution as litigation was avoided. In short, small 
scale privatization was fast and successful because it created revenue and maximized it 
during the bidding process at the auctions.  
3. Large Scale Privatization 
Large scale privatization has been accomplished through several privatization 
techniques. Small size enterprises were auctioned or sold through public tenders. Medium 
size enterprises were sold in public tender or through direct sales. The largest enterprises 
were sold through the voucher method. In the first stage of large scale privatization, the 
medium and the large size enterprises were transformed into joint stock companies with a 
given number of shares in an important part of the economy. The government in reality 
did not attempt to restructure enterprises before privatization and did not ask for 
submissions  of such proposals, as it was aware that it would delay privatization. 
However, interested buyers could submit their restructuring proposals. The approved 
restructuring proposals mainly concerned the break up of the large firms into smaller 
units. The second stage covered the sale or transfer of shares of joint stock companies to 
the public or another entities through auctions.37  
                                                 
35 John S. Earle, Roman Frydman, Andrzej Rapaczynski and Joel Turkewitz, “Eastern European 
Experience with Small Scale Privatization.” CFS: Discussion Paper, No. 104. New York: The World Bank, 
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36 Ibid., p. 17.  
37 Nemat Shafik, “Making a Market: Mass Privatization in the Czech and Slovak Republics,” 
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Estrin pointed out the limitations of mass privatization. The first limitation is the 
issue and transfer of coupons or certificates. The second limitation is exchanging them 
for shares. The third limitation is about trading them. The voucher privatization method 
allows for the fast transfer of ownership in the absence of owners capable of purchasing 
state assets. Estrin positively assessed the activities of the central authorities, who 
maintained relatively effective control over state owned firms in the former 
Czechoslovakia, and allowed firms to break up to a significant degree prior to 
privatization. 38 
The goal of the mass privatization program was the distribution of a large part of 
the state’s assets almost for free to the public in the form of vouchers and the quick 
transformation of property rights. A combination of techniques was implemented in the 
mass privatization process such as a coupon scheme, direct sale, joint ventures, 
restitution, the transformation of cooperatives and the transfer to municipalities.  
C. VOUCHER PRIVATIZATION  
Švejnar proposed a method to the Czechoslovak government based on the 
distribution of state assets for free to eligible citizens through several investment funds 
instituted and administrated by the state. After the transfer of state assets to the 
investment funds the shares are distributed equally to all citizens. Each citizen could 
obtain an equa l share in a larger number of privatized enterprises. Švejnar’s double 
portfolio decentralization method offers less risk, more equal distribution of property, but 
does not initiate the progress of a secondary capital market and sparks the interest of 
citizens in the stock market.39 
On the one hand, the savings of the Czech population were not enough to procure 
firms at their actual price. On the other hand, the sale of the crucial part of state assets to 
foreign investors was not considered desirable.40 Thus, the solution was the distribution 
of the crucial part of the state’s assets almost for free. The idea was to lure the population 
                                                 
38 Saul Estrin, “Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe,” Centre for Economic Reform and 
Transformation, London, 1996, September 1, 2001, Available [Online]: 
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39 Oldrich Kyn, “Market with Vouchers and Investment Funds,” Prague: CERGE, 1992, February 19, 
2002, Available [Online]: <http://econc10.bu.edu/okyn/Okpers/Vouchers/vouchers1.htm >, p. 4. 
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into becoming direct owners of property, gain their support for the transition, and create 
political and economic stability. The idea was to persuade the population that everybody 
had the same opportunity, that participation was voluntary and that everyone was in the 
same position at the beginning of the process. 
1. The Voucher Privatization Process 
Voucher privatization, an unt raditional form of privatization, began in October 
1991. The political reasoning behind a quick mass privatization was to cut the ties 
between firms and the state and rapidly create private property owners. It was designed to 
transform state owned assets into private hands in a relatively short time period of time 
between 1992 and 1995. Voucher privatization was accomplished in two stages.  
In each stage, citizens older than 18 were entitled to purchase one book of 
coupons for 1000 CZK, an average one-week salary, with 1,000 investment points. 
Whoever acquired a voucher book and registered it at one of the 648 registration 
centers41 had an opportunity during each stage to purchase shares of state firms that were 
at the same time transformed into joint stock firms.  
Kyn pointed out that the quality of the firms privatized by coupons was on the 
average lower than those privatized by direct sale.42 The government’s intention was to 
use the revenue from the purchase of voucher books to cover the administrative expenses 
of running the voucher method. On the other hand, the government decided to keep the 
majority of shares in large or strategic corporations. The shares of these firms were sold 
during the privatization process to well-known foreign corporations such as VW, Philip 
Morris, Procter & Gamble and General Motors. In direct sales, potential buyers had to 
demonstrate long term commitment.43 Various restrictions hindered the entry of foreign 
investors due to the awareness of the cheap sale off of attractive state assets.  
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Washington D.C.: The World Bank, Policy Research Paper No. 1231, 1993, p. 12. 
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2. The Privatization Projects 
The start of the coupon method required that all projects be ready at the same 
time. Therefore, the government spent a considerable amount of its time at the beginning 
on project processing for voucher privatization.44 The Ministry of Privatization assigned 
priorities to the projects and had the authority to make decisions except in the case of 
direct sales that required the approval of the republics or the Federal cabinet. On average, 
the number of submitted projects reached 3.8 per firm. A total of 18,106 privatization 
projects were submitted during the first wave.45 
Privatized firms had to submit privatization proposals describing assets and 
liabilities as well as the optimal means of privatization to the Ministry of Privatization. 
There was no preference for those either inside or outside of the privatized firms, but 
insiders had better access to privileged information. There were often several projects 
because any competing legal entity, domestic or foreign, had an opportunity to submit a 
privatization project using a standard format. Public participation was encouraged. 
Proposed projects could encompass one or a combination of permissible privatization 
methods such as direct sales to domestic or foreign entities, sealed bids, public auction, 
vouchers and restitution. There were 23,607 buyout proposals for 4,338 firms offered 
during the two waves from upper and middle management, local governments and 
consulting firms.46  However, the project review was flawed. The review of projects that 
participated in the coupon scheme did not have strict selection criteria.47  
3. The First Wave of Voucher Privatization 
In 1991, approximately 6,000 enterprises were taken into consideration for 
voucher privatization in Czechoslovakia. 4,400 were in the Czech Republic and 1,600 in 
the Slovak Republic. The government committed at least 300 billion CZK of the state’s 
assets in the first wave that was accomplished in 1992. Firms privatized in 
                                                 
44 Nemat Shafik, “Making a Market: Mass Privatization in the Czech and Slovak Republics,” 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank, Policy Research Paper No. 1231, 1993, p. 4. 
45 Ibid., p. 32.  
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Czechoslovakia in the first wave were more profitable and their number reached 3,100. 
The number of participants reached 8.65 million. 48 
The first wave began in 1992. It was slow in the beginning49 but 28 year old 
Victor Kožený, a Harvard educated entrepreneur, come up with an aggressive marketing 
campaign one month before the auctions. His Harvard Investment Fund attracted more 
than 800,000 citizens. Investment funds attracted the attention of people who were 
undecided and did not believe in the success of the voucher privatization system by 
promising them a quick return on their investments. In May 1992, more than 8 million 
people had bought voucher books. 
a. Dedicated Assets  
The government allocated 299,4 billion CZK of the state’s assets for the 
first wave of voucher privatization which was accomplished during the period March 
1992 to January 1993. The number of firms privatized in Czechoslovakia either entirely 
or partially through the voucher method reached 1,49150. They were more profitable than 
those included in the second wave. Firms privatized only by the voucher method had to 
allocate three percent of their shares towards restitution claims.  
The majority of shares were available to citizens  and small portions were 
dedicated to the National Property Fund, restitution, investors, municipalities and banks. 
The majority of privatized assets based on the book value were from banking, insurance 
and from industries such as electric power, iron and steel, metallurgy, chemicals, pulp 
and paper, and clothing. 51 The voucher privatization was the main form of privatization 
of large state firms. However, the strategic corporations were excluded from privatization 
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or were partially privatized. A large portfolio of those corporations was deposited in the 
National Property Fund.  
b. Participation 
The government’s goal was to sale 4-5 million coupon books. The initial 
public response to the government’s campaign was significantly lower or around 2 
million citizens. The marketing campaigns launched by the Investment Privatization 
Funds that were promising several times higher returns on investment 52 rapidly increased 
the number of participants. As the number of registered people increased, the estimated 
average value of the property per voucher book gradually declined from 150,000 CZK to 
35,000. The number of voucher holders in the first wave reached 8.54 million out of 10.5 
million eligible citizens or 75% of the citizens entitled to register.53 
c. Role of IPFs 
Prior to the start of bidding54, coupon book owners had an opportunity to 
allocate some or all the coupons to one or more of the 434 IPFs. Approximately 72% of 
all points were placed into IPFs during the first wave.  The thirteen largest IPFs gained 
56% of all points invested in IPFs. After bidding, 66% of all shares were in IPFs.55 
Laštovicka pointed out that a large number of IPFs would not survive or that some would 
go bankrupt because only a small number of points were collected.56  Regulations 
required that all funds had to invest at least in 10 firms. Anderson pointed out that larger 
funds invested in 100 or 200 enterprises.57 The strategy of one of the largest funds, the 
Harvard Investment Funds, during bidding was to concentrate roughly on 50 firms and to 
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significantly influence these companies. Others IPFs invested in a wider range of firms. 
The small and medium IPFs focused on smaller firms in the hope of having control over 
management.58 The most important feature of IPFs is that they help concentrate 
ownership and could better monitor and control the management of privatized companies 
since they are more educated and informed.59     
d. Participation in Bidding 
In both waves, the coupons were used for bidding on state enterprises, 
which entered into the particular wave of coupon privatization. Each wave consisted of 
five bidding rounds. The participation of voucher holders in each of the five bidding 
rounds was high (92%, 88%, 93%, 88.5%, and 90.3%).60 Participants could use the 
remaining coupons to play a game in the bidding process and convert coupons into 
shares. Investment points were allocated in multiples of one hundred. Bidders were able 
to diversify their portfolio only to some extent, as there was only a multiple of 200 points 
to a corporation. The most alluring shares for bidders were foreign trade, banking and 
insurance firms with a profit/equity ratio four to seven times higher than the average 
profit/equity ratio which was 17.6 in 1991.61  
e. Bidding Information and Behavior 
Two kinds of bidding information were available to bidders. First, the 
initial publication and information about bidding was published by the Center for Coupon 
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Privatization62 on May 13, 1992 as a guide for placing their coupons and public 
information in newspapers. The Center warned bidders about data quality and its 
relevance due to the rapidly changing economic environment. The second source was 
private information about the firms and funds. Shafik demonstrated empirical evidence 
that in the first two rounds of bidding, public information about a firm’s past performance 
was important since private information about firms was not revealed. The most 
significant factors for price determination in the bidding process were size, capital 
concentration, location and participation of foreign investors. Even using the best fitting 
regression analysis, he was not able to explain more than 29% price variation across 
firms. He assumes that unofficial sources of information and prior knowledge about the 
firm’s performance should explain the remaining differences that played a diminishing 
role as bidders learned bidding techniques from others.63 Laštovicka showed evidence 
that in the first wave individual investors preferred cheaper firms. In contrast, investment 
funds invested mostly in middle price companies. On average, funds paid more for their 
portfolio and more than individual investors did.64  
f. Bidding Pricing System  
Bidding rounds placed value on the firms by allowing bidders to interact. 
A pricing mechanism was created by a committee in the Federal Ministry of Finance to 
adjust the values of auctioned shares to the revealed ratios of supply and demand. The 
pricing rules for bidding, adopted by the Price Committee of the Federal Ministry of 
Finance, were aimed at transferring coupons for shares as soon as possible. In the case of 
excess demand for shares by less than 25% of individual citizens, demand was satisfied 
and the demand for investment funds was reduced to clear the market at a given price. 
When demand exceeded more than 25%, all shares were offered again in the next bidding 
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round at a higher price. The refore, prices were adjusted according to the degree of excess 
demand. A discriminatory pricing system was used to accelerate the bidding process at 
the expense of equity. 65  
g. Bidding Behavior   
The bidding behavior was interesting. The Czech citizens placed 99% of 
their vouchers in Czech enterprises and the Slovak citizens placed 90% of their shares in 
Slovak firms.66 In the first rounds, bidders focused on high quality companies. In the 
third round there was a massive shift to low price firms due to an excess of shares. IPFs 
bid more aggressively in the first round. In contrast, individuals who focused on large and 
well known firms with foreign participation demonstrated the same tendency in later 
rounds when they were more informed. IPFs participation rates were higher and more 
successful than were individual participants. Better organization and information could 
explain this tendency. The small and medium IPFs focused more on smaller enterprises.67 
h. Bidding Outcomes  
Five bidding rounds took place from March 1 to December 22, 1992. 
Švejnar summarized the success of the bidding in the five rounds (30%, 25.9%, 10.8%, 
12.4% and 13.7%). The first two rounds succeeded by selling almost 56% of the shares. 
At the end, 7.2% of the shares (62.5 million), 3.5% of the private coupons and 0.3% IPF 
vouchers were unsold.68 The IPFs were able to acquire 66% of the book value offered in 
the first wave of coupon privatization. 69 Only 251 enterprises out of 1491 were fully sold 
out.70 Shares that were not allocated in the bidding process were transferred to the 
National Property Fund.71 Shares acquired after the end of the first wave were not able to 
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be traded in the primary market, where the initial distribution of shares would occur, but 
in the secondary market. The new ownership structure of privatized firms was more 
consolidated than expected in the beginning. An average privatized firm was owned by 
three investment funds.72 
i. The Voucher Book Value  
As number of registered people increased, the estimated average value of 
the property per voucher book gradually declined from 130,000 CZK to 30,000.73 The 
media proclaimed that the range of outcomes was broad. The average accounting value of 
assets per book in the first wave was 35,000.74 Kyn estimates that the “risk free” 
expected present value of an average voucher book is 28,600 CZK. After including risk 
he concludes that the market value of the voucher books is only 14,000 CZK.75 
4. The Second Wave of Voucher Privatization 
The second wave was launched in 1994 after Czechoslovakia became the newly 
created Czech Republic. The number of voucher holders in the second wave reached 80% 
(6.16 million) of eligible citizens entitled to register. It was 75% in the first wave. The 
average accounting book value of assets decreased from 35,535 to 25,160 CZK.76 The 
total book value allocated for the second wave decreased by almost one quarter from 201 
billion to 155 billion CZK. The number of privatized firms declined from 943 to 867. 
The number of investment funds competing for coupons increased from 264 
during the first wave to 353. In contrast, the percentage of shares allocated to IPFs 
decreased from 72.5% to 64%.77 The second wave encompassed 165 firms that had 
auctioned shares in the first wave. Firms included in the second wave were mainly larger, 
but offered a smaller portion of shares for auction because the government decided to 
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maintain control in strategic companies. In 32 firms, which were mainly water- line firms, 
the majority of assets were transferred for free to municipalities.78  The second wave 
started in early 1994 and was successfully completed in March 1995.    
5. The Investment Privatization Funds (IPF)  
Privately sponsored investment privatization funds79 were established mainly by 
domestic, but also by foreign institutions, companies and private individuals. The Federal 
Parliaments Act number 248, which regulated the performance of the investment funds 
and corporations, was passed after the IPFs had started operations. The intention of the 
parliament was to reduce the risk for citizens investing in IPFs. The law determined the 
reporting requirements and disclosure rules of operations by IPFs and limited their fees to 
an initial fee of 2% and a 3% fee for assets management.80 
By law, IPFs were not allowed to buy more than 20% of the shares of an 
individual company. The shares of an individual company could not exceed 10% of the 
total value of assets of one IPF. IPFs established by the same founder could not buy more 
than 20% of the shares of an individual company. Shares of a single company could not 
exceed more than 20% of the total assets of all funds established by the same person. 
“Limits on fund ownership of about 20% do not seem to greatly impair the ability of 
funds to govern enterprises”. 81 
The Harvard Investment Funds (HIF) issued guarantees for 10,000 CZK, which 
indicates that it was not exposed to great risks. In contrast, IPFs issuing higher guarantees 
could easily get into difficulties in fulfilling their commitments since the estimated 
market value of a voucher book was 15,000 CZK.82 Some funds made unrealistic 
promises to the new shareholders and appointed inadequately qualified members to 
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management boards. They mainly bought shares in companies that had a higher price but 
also a greater earning potential. 83 
Prior to the start of the bidding, coupon book owners had an opportunity to 
allocate some or all coupons to one or more of the 429 registered IPFs, 264 in the Czech 
Republic and 165 in the Slovak Republic.84 Those who allocated coupons in the IPFs 
received shares in the funds in exchange and became fund shareholders. The IPFs used 
accumulated vouchers to bid for shares in enterprises in the bidding process. At the end 
of the bidding, they received shares in the former state owned enterprises that were 
transferred into private hands. Funds became owners of the newly privatized funds after 
share distribution in April 1993.  
The largest IPFs85 had been established by domestic financial institutions such as 
Ceská Sporitelna, Komercní Banka, Investicni Banka, Živnostenská Banka and Ceská 
Pojištovna, and one by Creditanstalt, which is a foreign financial institution and three by 
the private agents of HCC, PPF and YSE. The largest and most popular IPFs were run by 
commercial and saving banks, and insurance companies, which had credibility and 
reputations. In the first wave, the IPFs attracted many participants. The Czech Savings 
Bank acquired 6.9% of the shares, the Czech Commercial Bank 2.9%, and the Slovak 
Commercial Bank 2.6%. The ten largest IPFs controlled 23.6% of all the shares.86 Kyn 
warned that a large increase in the sale of shares in certain IPFs could unleash a 
snowballing effect and could lead to the collapse of such funds.87 On the other hand, it 
could lead to the further concentration of ownership in some companies. Foreign as well 
as domestic capital could create additional demand for shares. 
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III. PRIVATIZATION IN HUNGARY AND POLAND 
This chapter explores the privatization methods implemented in Hungary and 
Poland dur ing the transition from a command economy to a free market economy. Both 
countries chose a moderate pace of reforms, but their approach to privatization differed in 
terms of the implemented methods and in the speed of privatization. Poland was very 
slow to privatize its state-owned enterprises. 
A. PRIVATIZATION IN HUNGARY 
This section reveals the speed of privatization and privatization methods used by 
the Hungarian government. Privatization in Hungary occurred in three stages. In the first 
stage (1990-1994), the state sold enterprises that were easy to sell and  encouraged 
employee and management buyouts. During the second stage (1995-1997), privatization 
was accelerated by the sale of the large strategic firms such as energy suppliers, banks 
and strategic firms to strategic investors. In the third stage (from 1997), the government 
sold its minority stakes and used capital market methods of privatization. 88  
1. The Speed of Privatization  
The starting conditions for Hungary were more favorable than those for the Czech 
Republic. When the communist regime collapsed, state ownership in the competitive 
sector accounted for 85%89 of the GDP while the private sector was generating 20% of 
the GDP due to previous reforms initiated in the 1980’s. In 1989, the state owned 
approximately 1,832-2200 large and about 10,000 smaller enterprises valued at 
approximately HUF 2,000 billion ($30 billion).90  
The Hungarian post-communist government’s privatization policy emphasized: 
(a) economic efficiency, (b) commercial privatization and involvement of larger 
investors, (c) sale to foreign investors, (d) gradual privatization, and (e) transparency and 
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accountability. The target set by the government was to privatize 50% of state assets by 
1994.91 
Two institutions managed the privatization program in Hungary. The State 
Property Agency (SPA) established in 1990 managed the privatization of small and 
medium size enterprises. The State Holding Company (SHC) established in 1992 
managed the transfer of larger enterprises into private hands. In 1995, the SPA and SHC 
merged into the Hungarian Privatization and State Holding Company.  
The privatization process started at a slow pace in the second quarter of 1990. The 
first privatization program was launched by the SPA in September 1990 and involved 20 
successful companies. However, it was a failure.92 The Hungarian privatization processes 
started to accelerate in the summer of 1994 when the government decided to make the 
sale of state assets a higher priority. The government, led by Gyula Horn, introduced a 
new strategy for privatization: (a) acceleration of privatization, (b) sale of assets rather 
than distributive methods, (c) increasing the role of enterprise management, (d) 
encourage private firms to manage state-owned enterprises.93  
In 1994, Hungary generated only $300 million from privatization that was only 
20% of the target set.94 Privatization accelerated dramatically in 1995 when details of the 
privatization program were resolved and many public utility enterprises were sold. In 
May 1995, Parliament implemented a law for greater control of privatization transactions. 
The implemented law lacked clarity and even contradicted a number of points. The 
strategic sectors were not prioritized. The goal was at least to partially retain ownership 
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and keep a majority of the shares in the strategic sector. In contrast, the Parliament 
decided to sell 50% of its stake in the power generating and distributing sector.95 
By mid 1995, 1460 privatization transactions had been completed mainly through 
open tender. It involved the liquidation of 536 larger enterprises and the privatization of 
924.  The value of involved assets reached $10 billion and generated a profit of $3.5 
billion. The value of the state’s share held in 740 enterprises accounted for HUF 1.500 
billion ($10.5 billion).96 The state held a majority of the stakes in 441 enterprises. Among 
them, 24 were considered strategic with a value of HUF 1,007 billion. 97  
At the end of year 1995, the book value of privatized state owned enterprises 
peaked and HUF 481 billion state-owned assets were transferred to private owners. It was 
more than the sum of the previous five years. The cash revenue totaled HUF 438 billion. 
Only 12 completely state owned companies remained, but there were several hundred 
with majority and minority state ownership. About 60% of the banking sector was in 
private hands. In some sectors, the state’s share was even higher. Trade was 90%, 
construction and textiles 75%, and the paper industry 60%.98 The new governments set a 
new target to privatize about half of the state equity holdings valued at HUF 700 billion 
($5 billion) by the end of 1997.99  
At the end of 1997, the bulk of state property had been privatized and the private 
sector generated 75% of the GDP. The largest 200 state companies accounted for more 
than one third of the country's production and half of its profits.100 At the end of June 
1998 only 228 companies belonged to the Hungarian Privatization and State Holding 
Company. Less than 100 strategic enterprises would remain in state ownership. The 
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government privatized 1,188 (68%) firms out of a total of 1,858 state firms dedicated to 
privatization by the end of 1998.101 In addition, state assets of HUF300-500 billion in 
more than 100 firms had been put up for sale in 1998. However, a large number of state 
assets were waiting to be privatized. The state intended to keep its golden share in 
approximately 180 enterprises valued at HUF300 billion. 102  
 
Table 1.   Privatization Revenues of SPA and 1990-1995 (HUF Billion). 
 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Revenue  1  31  77  170  157  481  176  350  112  133  59 
From: The State Audit Office, Hungary, 2001 
 
At the end of 2000, the mass institutional privatization was completed. The state 
retained its ownership in 175 enterprises, while 1230 had been privatized and 740 closed 
down. The book value of state owned enterprises fell from HUF 1,700 billion to HUF 
800 billion. The revenue from privatization amounted to HUF 1.747 billion, with 60% in 
foreign investments, which represents 40% of the total direct foreign investments ($21 
billion). However, of that amount, 75% was done during 1995-1999. In 1995, income 
from privatization amounted to HUF 481 billion, of which 95% was in cash and 87% in 
foreign currency. 103 
2. Privatization Programs and Methods  
In contrast to other Visegrad countries, the mass privatization method had 
marginal importance in Hungary. The state assets were sold, auctioned or variously 
distributed for free. The government played an active role in reorganizing and 
restructuring the companies. The amount spent on these activities exceeded HUF 600 
billion.  
a. Free Distribution 
Free distribution of the state assets occurred in several forms. Social and 
political reasons led the government to free distribution. The first reason was to gain 
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political support for reforms. The second reason was to create a broad middle class. Free 
distribution occurred through: (a) restitution, (b) transfer of property rights, (c) 
compensation notes, and (d) the Small Investor Share Program. 
Restitution was the prevalent method used for free distribution. Restitution 
occurred in the form of a compensation scheme. About $650 million in notes were issued 
to purchase loans, apartments, or shares in properties owned by SPA, AVU or SHC.104 
The state freely transferred a part of state assets to churches, local governments, social 
security funds and certain groups of individuals. Compensation notes valued at HUF 220 
billion were distributed to two million citizens whose property was deprived or whose 
human rights had been violated. This method proceeded slowly and was not completed 
by the spring of 1999. The unsuccessful Small Investor Share Program that started in 
1994 was a project similar to the Czech voucher coupon system.  This method offered all 
Hungarian citizens an opportunity to become company owners. However, the new 
government, elected in 1994, decided to stop this program, because it was contrary to its 
privatization strategy. 105  
b. Spontaneous Privatization  
The first privatization method known as spontaneous privatization lasted 
from 1988 until the establishment of the SPA in March 1990. This method led to the 
commercialization of enterprises. However, the state retained its majority ownership in 
the newly formed enterprises. The spontaneous privatization consisted of two forms. 
First, large enterprises divided themselves into smaller companies. The restructured 
enterprise took some of its assets into a new joint venture with an external partner, mainly 
a foreign company. The main goal was to segregate profitable and non-profitable units 
and give the more profitable units a chance to survive and find new partners. Second, the 
large restructuring holding companies formed new companies from their factories and 
other assets, often with the involvement of foreign partners. The holding companies kept 
majority stakes in the newly formed enterprises.  
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This method boosted the formation of a large number of new companies 
but lacked state supervision and its scope was small. Often the state assets were sold or 
transferred below their market value. Spontaneous privatization attracted only a slow 
inflow of foreign capital. The majority of enterprises using this method failed because 
they were not able to attract an inflow of capital and enter new markets.  The estimated 
value of assets transferred from the state to newly formed companies is HUF100 
billion. 106  
c. First Privatization Program 
The first privatization program was launched by the SPA in September 
1990. The program attempted to implement privatization methods and procedures used in 
western countries and gain experience. This program involved 20 successful larger 
companies from all sectors of the economy. The value of assets devoted to this program 
accounted for HUF 70 billion. The foreign consultants estimated that the revenue from 
privatization would reach HUF 30-40 billion.  
This program was a failure due to the slow pace of privatization 
procedures, considerable decline in the market value of company assets and the changing 
economic environment. Only ten out of twenty firms were restructured at the end of 
1991. Six firms involved in this program went into liquidation. Eventually, only ten 
enterprises were privatized with a revenue of HUF 22 billion. 107  
d. Small Scale Privatization (Pre-Privatization) 
The so-called small privatization was the main avenue for privatizing the 
retail and trade sectors. The small privatization program, which involved retail and 
catering, and service sectors started in the spring of 1990. The government chose a 
gradual approach to privatization with an emphasis on insiders and the privatization of 
entire enterprises. The small scale privatization program was designed to privatize 
approximately 9,800 small-scale enterprises, nearly US $200 million in assets, during 
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1990-1994.108 A number of programs were designed for particular segments. Only a 
small portion of enterprises has been transferred to private owners. The majority of small 
enterprises were grouped into integrated commercial entities before privatization.  
Although over 10,300 small units have been privatized through a 
Preprivatization Program109, over 12,00 units remained in state hands. More than 70% of 
the transfers involved leases for a ten-year period. Auctions and negotiated sales were the 
preferred methods of sale.110 By mid 1999, the revenue from small scale privatization 
amounted to HUF 20.1 billion. 111 The pace of small scale privatization was slower than 
in the Czech Republic or in Poland. The long delays were caused by legal disputes 
regarding land registration and leasehold rights.  
e. The Self-Privatization 
The self-privatization program for small to medium firms initiated by the 
SPA in 1991 occurred in two stages. In the first stage, the selected companies were 
transformed into commercial corporations. The SPA reserved for itself legal control, but 
delegated rights and responsibilities for selling state assets to private consulting firms, 
which conducted the enterprise evaluation and created the transformation and 
privatization plans. The consultants were motivated by compensation depending on the 
pace of privatization and price. In addition, the SPA encouraged enterprise management 
participation. As a result, most enterprises covered by the program were sold. The second 
stage of self-privatization incorporated the sale of shares.  
The first phase started in September 1991 with 83 small enterprises.112 
The criteria for the selection of enterprises were: (a) the number of employees had to be 
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less than 300, (b) turnover had to be less than HUF 100 million, and (c) the value of 
equity had to be less than HUF 300 million. In total, this phase involved 457 firms.113  
The second phase that began in August 1992 involved larger firms with 
less than 1,000 employees, with a value less than HUF1 billion, and with an annual 
turnover under HUF1 billion. 114 In total, this phase involved 292 enterprises.115  
The self-privatization program ended in March 1994. Out of 478 
transformed enterprises, 412 enterprises were sold. Domestic investors purchased two 
thirds of the sold enterprises through E-credit or compensation vouchers.116  
f. The Simplified Privatization 
The State Privatization and Holding Company (SPHC) launched the 
simplified privatization scheme in May 1995. SPHC exercised greater bureaucratic 
authority over privatization transactions and emphasized the case-by-case evaluation.117  
The simplified privatization scheme was designed for small and medium size business 
establishments with fewer than 500 employees and assets less than HUF600 million. The 
senior management of privatized enterprises mainly managed the privatization process 
and recommended the sale price. Mainly, domestic investors succeeded in privatizing 37 
firms by the end of 1995. In the meantime, 34 enterprises failed to do so. The 
privatization of the next group of 48 enterprises was launched in March 1996.118   
In total, the simplified privatization included 138 enterprises. The 
privatization revenue from 90 sold enterprises amounted to HUF 6.2 billion. The limited 
price was the main weakness of this program that was concluded in 1997.   
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g. Liquidation  
When the transition began, a large number of state owned enterprises were 
close to bankruptcy. In Hungary, more than 400 state firms were closed down. The loss 
of equity due to liquidation reached 40-50%.119 Liquidation and asset stripping had been 
common procedures in Hungary. Banks often filed claims to liquidate enterprises failing 
to repay. “Asset stripping has frequently occurred, reflecting weaknesses in the legal 
framework that have undermined the effectiveness of bankruptcy and liquidation 
procedures.”120 By mid 1995 approximately 536 enterprises had been liquidated.121 This 
number increased to 740 by the end of 2000.122 
h. Preferential Privatization by Management and Employee  
The goal of preferential privatization was to develop a middle class and 
entrepreneurs. In many sectors, domestic buyers had an opportunity to purchase state 
property. Since they lacked resources, the government supported the establishment of 
several schemes: (a) E-credit, (b) Employee share scheme, (c) Small Investors' Share 
Purchase Program, and (d) Privatization leasing.    
Domestic private individuals had an opportunity to acquire an E-credit at 
an interest rate of 7% for up to 15 years to purchase shares, land or state property. E-
credit contributed to employee and management buyouts in more than 400 transactions 
valued at HF 68.15 billion between 1990 and 2000.  
In 1992, the Hungarian government made employee share ownership of 5-
10 % of the company’s stock a higher priority. Employees of all firms had the 
opportunity to purchase shares in their own firms on preferential terms other than E-
credit up to 10% of the assets, even if the firm was sold to outside investors. The 
                                                 
119 A paper by the State Audit Office, “Privatization in Hungary 1990-2000,” Budapest: The State 
Audit Office, Hungary. Presented to INTOSAI Working Group, June 11-12, 2001, Available [Online],   
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120 Michael S. Borish and Michael Noel, “Private Sector Development during Transition: The 
Visegrad Countries,” Washington D.C.: The World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 318, February 1996, p. 65.  
121 Ibid., p. 66.  
122 A paper by the State Audit Office, “Privatization in Hungary 1990-2000,” Budapest: The State 
Audit Office, Hungary. Presented to INTOSAI Working Group, June 11-12, 2001, Available [Online],   
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employee share program was subsidized by the state. The terms were a 10-year credit 
with an interest rate of 7% and a two-year repayment plan. The receipts under this 
scheme were valued at HUF 70.4 billion. The less preferred privatization leasing scheme 
has been used only in 27 cases valued at HUF 6 billion.  
B. PRIVATIZATION IN POLAND 
1. The Speed of Privatization 
The start of privatization was more favorable for Poland than for the Czech 
Republic. The private sector in Poland had strong roots. In 1989 in Poland, around 56% 
of the total retail trade, consumer and service sector were private.123  
The Polish political representatives favored gradual privatization. The political 
forces were not opened to a rapid and broad privatization. In addition, parliamentary 
decisions and government policies influenced the pace of privatization. ”Many politicians 
still fail to grasp the importance of privatization for the whole economy and the 
consequences of its delay.”124 
The gradual pace of privatization was positive for many enterprises, but it had 
negative consequences for those on the waiting list. The gradual pace of privatization 
created conditions that allowed the newly privatized firms to prosper but other firms 
suffered. The case-by-case approach to privatization was slow, because the administrative 
apparatus was not able to handle the quick transfer of state owned assets into private 
hands.  
a. Entry into Privatization  
At the start of privatization, the state owned a total of 8,441 enterprises. 
Based on the statistical data provided by the Polish Ministry of the Treasury, during 
1991-2001, privatization transactions began with 5,353 enterprises, or about 63 % of the 
total state-owned enterprises at the start of privatization. The number of state-owned 
enterprises privatized peaked in 1992 when 819 cases were opened. However, after that 
the pace of privatization decreased. In the period since July 1990 to December 1997, the 
                                                 
123 Louisa Vinton, “Privatization in Poland: A Statistical Picture,” Available [Online], 
<http://ciesin.ci.uw.edu.pl/poland/privatizationintro.html>, p. 1.  
124 Barbara Blaszczyk,” Moving Ahead: Privatization in Poland, Economic Reform Today,” 
Privatization in Digital Age, No.2, 1999, Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), 
<http://www.cipe.org/ert/e32/e32_04.php3>.  
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privatization process started with 4,358 companies and bankruptcy was initiated for 542 
enterprises. However, the number of state owned enterprises was still high or 3,326.125  
 
Table 2.   The Number of Privatization Transaction Started Each Year in Poland. 
 
  1990-1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Total  1210  819  469  487  530  412  431  297  302  259  137 
From: Ministry of Treasury, Poland, 2002 
 
b. Completed Privatization Transactions  
The number of completed privatization transactions has been increasing 
slowly with exception of 1996 when the privatization of 923 state-owned enterprises was 
finished.  During 1990-1993, the number of privatized state-owned enterprises reached 
991 as a result of completed capital privatization in 567 enterprises.  
In the period since July 1990 to December 1996, the privatization process 
affected 2,593 enterprises. Some 1,076 companies were commercialized. This meant that 
they were transformed into joint-stock companies with 100% of their shares owned by 
the Polish State Treasury. Of them, actually 787 were sold to private investors. Direct 
privatization began with 1,371 state-owned companies and ended with 1,243.  The 
liquidation process was initiated for 1,480 state-owned companies, but only 563 
companies were liquidated.  
Blaszczyk pointed out that since 1990 to the end of 1998 about 72.6% or 
6,129 out of a total of 8,441 state-owned companies was partially or wholly privatized. 
At the end of 1998, the number of state owned enterprises was 2,906, of which 1,818 
conducted full economic activity. The government completed 278 bankruptcy procedures 
for state enterprises and implemented 203 bank conciliation procedures.126  
 
 
                                                 
125 Ministry of Treasury, Poland, Department of European Integration and Foreign Relations, 
Privatisation Quarterly, January - December 2001, March 2002, Available [Online], <www.msp.gov.pl>, 
pp. 15-16. 
126 Barbara Blaszczyk,” Moving Ahead: Privatization in Poland, Economic Reform Today,” 
Privatization in Digital Age, No. 2, 1999, Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE),  
<http://www.cipe.org/ert/e32/e32_04.php3>.   
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Table 3.   The Number of Completed Privatization Transaction in Poland by Method. 
 
  1990-1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Capital                       
Privatization  28  23  47  36  86  567  58  41  26  26  32 
Direct                        
Privatization  182  293  232  238  109  189  174  155  151  146  55 
Liquidation  19  67  100  117  93  167  115  90  52  40  9 
Total  229  383  379  391  288  923  347  286  229  212  96 
From: Ministry of Treasury, Poland, 2002 
 
c. Privatization Revenue 
In comparison to other Visegrad countries, Poland has generated relatively 
low revenues from privatization during 1991-1997.  However, the revenues had an 
inclining tendency. In 1997, the privatization revenues exceeded 1% of the GDP. The 
large number of enterprises still waiting to be privatized could explain this trend. Out of 
the 8,441 formerly state-owned firms, only about 44% have been privatized.127 
 
Table 4.   Revenues from Privatization. 
 
  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Percent of GDP  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.8  0.9  0.9  1.4 
From: Gesell, Müller and Süß, 1998 
 
d. What was Achieved?  
What was achieved from August 1990 to the end of 2001? Privatization 
began in 5,353 state enterprises. In December 2001, the number of state owned 
enterprises was still high at 2,054. In 1,499 cases, the state firms were commercialized, of 
which 970 firms were sold.  From this number, 315 firms were capital privatizations, 16 
were done through commercialization with a conversion of debt, 512 through the coupon 
method and 127 firms through the conversion of liabilities for shares. The direct method 
of privatization through sale, employee leasing or contributions into new business started 
in 2,086 firms and was completed in 1,928 companies. Liquidation procedures were 
initiated for 1,752 state firms due to poor economic performance. Bankruptcy was 
                                                 
127 Rainer Gesell, Katharina Müller and Dirck Süß, “Social Security Reform and Privatisation in 
Poland:  Parallel Projects or Integrated Agenda?” Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies (FIT), 
Discussion Paper No. 8, 1998, p. 11.  
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announced for 656 state owned companies, of which, 869 were completed. In September 
2001, the State Treasury held shares in 1,769 firms. Of them, 499 companies were the 
State Treasury Corporations. In 34 firms the state retained more than 75%, in 72 
companies 50-75%, and in 1,184 firms it held minority stakes.128  
2. Privatization Methods  
The Polish approach was based on the adoption of time consuming methods of 
privatization rather than on fast privatization and the selection of the best possible 
investors for privatized enterprises. Poland favored traditional privatization methods such 
as sales to strategic foreign investors, public share offering and proper institutional rules. 
Three main privatization methods were implemented: (a) commercialization (capital 
privatization), (b) privatization through liquidation (direct privatization) and (c) 
privatization through the National Investment Funds (NIF) (coupon privatization). The 
method selected depends upon the company's annual turnover, financial situation, 
number of employees, and the interest of investors.  
The table below shows the direction of Polish privatization by methods. Although 
the number of companies privatized through capital privatization is low most of the 
privatization revenues proceed from that method. It has been used for the privatization of 
companies in good shape and to attracted foreign investors. At the same time, 155 
companies were considered strategic.129   
 
Table 5.   Enterprises Undergoing Ownership Transformation (as of Dec. 31, 1997). 
 
Privatization  Direct  Bankruptcy  Capital   Coupon  Total 
Method  Privatization  Liquidation  Privatization  Privatization   
Number            
of enterprises  1,489  1,489  227  512  3717 
From: Gesell, Müller and Süß, 1998 
 
Privatization by traditional methods proved to be successful in terms of completed 
privatization, reliable corporate governance and good economic performance. 
                                                 
128 Ministry of Treasury, Poland, Department of European Integration and Foreign Relations, 
Privatisation Quarterly, January - December 2001, March 2002, Available [Online], <www.msp.gov.pl>, 
p. 6. 
129 Rainer Gesell, Katharina Müller and Dirck Süß, “Social Security Reform and Privatisation in 
Poland: Parallel Projects or Integrated Agenda?” Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies (FIT), 
Discussion Paper No. 8, 1998, p. 9.  
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Traditionally privatized firms reinvested 10% to 30% of their sales annually. On the other 
hand, state-owned firms, and partly privatized firms invested only 1% to 3% of their 
sales. The private sector investments in the second half of 1997 reached 53.4% of the 
total investments.130 
a. Capital Privatization (Commercialization) 
In the first phase, the capital privatization involved the transformation of 
state firms into state treasury corporations in the form of joint stock or limited liability 
firms. In the initial phase, the state fully retains its ownership. In the second phase, the 
Treasury shares or stakes are sold through negotiations with potential buyers or persons 
other than the Treasury. Privatization is carried out through public offerings, public 
tender and negotiations. It was assumed that the Minister of the Treasury would carry out 
capital privatization for approximately 90 companies.131  
b. Direct Privatization 
Direct privatization through liquidation was used for small and medium 
size firms in good financial condition. This method allowed employee and management 
buyouts. Liquidated firms were permitted to sell assets without passing through a court 
insolvency procedure. They were sold, incorporated into another firms or leased to a firm 
owned by a majority of the employees. For instance, a state firm is liquidated and its 
assets are leased to a company that is created for that purpose. Managers and workers of 
the former state enterprise mainly controlled these companies. This method became the 
principal method for starting small and medium size enterprises. Direct privatization has 
generated little income because it favors insiders. Leasing was applied in about 65% of 
the cases by the end of 1997. The leasing rates were set at a level low enough not to 
pressure enterprises’ financial capacity and still allow restructuring investment.132 
 
                                                 
130 Barbara Blaszczyk,” Moving Ahead: Privatization in Poland, Economic Reform Today,” 
Privatization in Digital Age, No. 2, 1999, Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), 
<http://www.cipe.org/ert/e32/e32_04.php3>. 
131 A Review of Poland's Privatization Methods, Central and Eastern Europe Business Information 
Center (CEEBIC), June 1997, Available [Online], 
<http://www.mac.doc.gov/eebic/pub/plfp/1197/priv.htm>, p. 1 . 
132 Rainer Gesell, Katharina Müller and Dirck Süß, “Social Security Reform and Privatisation in 
Poland: Parallel Projects or Integrated Agenda?” Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies (FIT), 
Discussion Paper No. 8, 1998, p. 10.  
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c. Coupon Privatization 
Only a small part of the Polish economy was privatized by the coupon 
privatization method. This method was not designed to speed up privatization but to 
reassure Polish citizens that they were the principal beneficiaries of privatization. Coupon 
privatization started with the commercialization of 512 large and medium size companies 
involved in this program. Then, they were transferred to 15 National Investment Funds 
(NIF) designed to sell shares to domestic or foreign investors and establish joint ventures 
by NIF. Frequent changes in the government delayed the implementation of coupon 
privatization until 1994. NIF share certificates were distributed for free to the public in 
1995-96. This method was applied to 10% of the public assets.133 The experience 
demonstrated that it is very difficult to settle extensive privatization with the intended 
outcome and good corporate governance.  
d. Small-Scale Privatization 
Poland had to privatize less in so-called small privatization than the 
former Czechoslovakia. In contrast with Hungary, the privatization of small 
establishments mainly in retail and services in Poland proceeded rapidly. From its start in 
1989 up to the end of 1992, about 82% of small units (194,000) were privatized. They 
were mainly sold to former employees below their market value.134  
e. Complementary Methods of Privatization   
There were two complementary methods of privatization in Poland: (a) 
privatization through restructuring, and (b) bankruptcy liquidation. Privatization through 
restructuring was designed for companies that needed to improve their financial 
condition. After successful restructuring, the companies are sold. When using the method 
of bankruptcy liquidation method, enterprises were dissolved, assets sold and revenues 
used to pay off the enterprises’ debts. This method has not generated any revenue at all.  
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The first part of this chapter provides macroeconomic comparisons of the 
Visegrad countries in order to reveal to what extent the pace of privatization and 
privatization methods affected macroeconomic development among these countries. The 
goal is to determine to what extent the Czech Republic differed from the other Visegrad 
countries. All of them had to transform their economies and privatize an enormous part of 
state assets into private hands, but their approaches to privatization varied. The pace was 
important to the Czech Republic. In contrast, Poland and Hungary favored gradual 
transformation.  
The second part of this chapter compares the progress in the transition among the 
Visegrad countries that have made remarkable progress in the last decade in terms of the 
pace and scope of economic transition. First, it compares the progress in price and trade 
liberalization. Next, it looks at the progress in privatization. Then, it reveals the extent of 
private sector development and employment. Finally, it examines the progress in 
privatization and what remains for further privatization.  
A. MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS 
This section attempts to answer the question of why people were talking about the 
Czech miracle. It indicates that important differences exist among the Visegrad countries. 
However, it is difficult to examine the link between privatization and its economic 
outcomes. The examination of the economic performance of the Visegrad countries 
shows some similarities but also significant differences in terms of GDP growth, inflation 
and unemployment.  
This multi cross-country survey is supported by positive and negative findings. In 
1995, the so-called Czech miracle, the economic transformation from a command 
economy to a liberal economy with minimum unemployment as seen in Figure 3 and no 
hyperinflation as seen in Figure 1, has been seen by many as a new pattern to follow. 
Within the last decade, the Czech government outperformed its neighbors in terms of 
lower inflation and more balanced current accounts as indicated in Figures 1 and 5. In 
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terms of lower unemployment it was successful up to 1998, but since 1999, the 
Hungarian performance has been slightly better as shown in Figure 3.  
The next two macroeconomic indicators, the growth rate and foreign direct 
investments, have been less favorable for the Czech government. The Polish economy 
has grown significantly faster than the economies of its neighbors. From the lowest level 
of economic growth, achieved from the start of the transition process to 1998, the GDP in 
the Polish economy grew by 42.5% compared to a growth in the GDP in Slovakia of 
32.9%, and in Hungary of 16.2%. The Czech performance was the worst among the 
Visegrad countries with growth rate of 12.7%.135  
During 1991-1997, Hungary received the greatest inflow of direct foreign 
investment among the Visegrad countries. However, the inflow of foreign investments 
rapidly increased in the Czech Republic in 1998 and in Slovakia in 1999. In contrast, 
Poland maintained a moderate growing inflow of investments. This significant change in 
the pattern of investments was caused by the increased pace of privatization through 
direct sale in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland. In contrast, ending privatization 
in Hungary has reduced the flow of direct foreign investments.      
The findings disapprove that there was a Czech economic miracle because the 
macroeconomic performance of the Czech Republic in the last decade was to some extent 
similar to that of other Visegrad countries. The Czech government has had lower inflation 
and unemployment but the economic growth and the flow of direct foreign investment 
has been less than in some of the other Visegrad countries. Hungary and Poland 
performed better on a number of variables in the late 1990s. Industrial restructuring in the 
Czech Republic hardly occurred during the last decade and has not reached the previous 
levels of 1990. 
The Czech Republic’s failure to restructure is particularly striking 
compared to the steady growth of industrial output in both Poland and 
Hungary since 1995 (OECD, 1999). These large differences in the pace of 
industrial restructuring have recently become reflected in GDP growth. In 
                                                 
135 From 1989 to 1998, the GDP of the Polish economy grew by 17%, while the growth of the Slovak 
economy remained the same and the GDP of the Czech and Hungarian economies declined by 5%. See 
Gomulka, Stanislav. “Ten Years in Retrospect: Secrets of Successful macroeconomic Policies,” Transition 
Newsletter, Washington D.C.: The World Bank/The William Davidson Institute, Vol. 11, No. 5, August-
October 2000, p. 18.  
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1998 GDP in the Czech Republic contracted by 3%, in contrast to a 5% 
expansion in Poland and Hungary. 136 
1. Inflation  
Shortly after the start of the transition process, inflation increased in the former 
Czechoslovakia for a short period of time. In 1990, inflation increased to 10.8% of the 
GDP and in the next year inflation in the Czech Republic reached 56.7% of the GDP. The 
Slovak Republic followed a similar pattern with a higher inflation rate of 61.2% of the 
GDP in 1991. This sharp increase was caused by the implementation of a profound price 
liberalization policy, and by currency devaluation. 137 This high rate of inflation led to a 
sharp decline of real wages.138 In 1992, inflation significantly decreased to 11.1% in the 
Czech Republic and to 10.1% in the Slovak Republic.  
The Velvet divorce once caused again an increase in inflation. In the newly 
established Czech Republic, the inflation rate reached 20.8% of the GDP, and in the 
Slovak Republic 23% of the GDP. During 1994-1998, inflation in the Czech Republic 
was quite stable, mainly in the single digits, or 8-10.2% of the GDP. The following year 
inflation dropped to 1.8% of the GDP and more than doubled in 2000. In the Slovak 
Republic, inflation followed a bathtub curve during 1994-2000.  The years 1994 and 
2000 saw it at its maximum of 14% and 12.1% of the GDP respectively, and at a 
minimum in 1996 of 5.8% of the GDP.  
Hungary and Poland when compared to the Czech Republic had higher average 
rates of inflation with the one exception of Hungary in 1991. In the last decade, inflation 
in Hungary in 1991 reached 34.2% of the GDP. In the following years, inflation dropped 
to 19% in 1994. However, in 1995, the inflation rate sharply increased to 28.3% of the 
GDP when the Hungarian government introduced some macroeconomic adjustment 
measures. Inflation further declined in the years 1996-2000. The year-on-year inflation 
rate fell almost by 5% of the GDP yearly despite a 20% increase in the gross average 
wages in 1998. At the end of the decade the inflation rate remained stabilized at 10%.  
                                                 
136 Andrew Spicer, Gerry McDermott and Bruce Kogut, “Entrepreneurship and Privatization in 
Central Europe: The Tenuous Balance Between Destruction and Creation,” A Working Paper of the 
Reginald H. Jones Center, No. 04, The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania, August 1999, p. 17.   
137 In 1990, the currency devaluation reached 113.5%. See a World Bank Country Study, No. 19650, 
“Czech Republic: Toward EU Accession, Main Report”, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999, p. 2. 
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Inflation in Poland was the worst among the Visegrad countries. In 1990, the 
Polish government was faced with hyperinflation when the inflation rate reached 586% of 
the GDP. The government reined in inflation the next year and the inflation rate sharply 
decreased to 70.3% of the GDP. In the following years, this positive trend continued. In 
1999, the inflation rate reached 7.2% of the GDP, but in the next year, moderately 
increased to 10.1% of the GDP.    
Inflation in the Czech Republic was the best among the Visegrad countries.  There 
was no hyperinflation. It was considered a pattern to follow. There were only two years 
in which the inflation rate was significantly higher in the Czech and Slovak Republics. 
The first was in 1991 when the Czechoslovak government introduced a rapid 
transformation with a profound liberalization of prices and trade. The inflation rate in the 
Czech Republic climbed to 56.7% and to 61.2 % in the Slovak Republic. The second year 
was in 1993 but the impact was less due to the separation of the former Czechoslovakia.  
 











































Figure 1.   Average Inflation Rate (Average CPI %). 
From: World Bank 1999 & EU 2001 
 
 
                                                 
138 .Ibid., p. 74. The real wage fell by 5.5% in 1990 and 26.3% in 1991. 
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The extensive stabilization program implemented by the government during the 
early years of the transition process led to this success.139 In 1995, when everybody was 
talking about “the Czech miracle”, the Czech Republic had the lowest inflation rate 
among the transition countries. However, problems appeared soon afterwards. Due to the 
first post communist recession and growing inflation in early 1998, the Czech Central 
Bank (CNB) introduced a monetary policy targeting inflation. The target for 1998 was in 
the range of 5.5-6.5%. The strict monetary policy, declining domestic demand and 
commodity prices helped push inflation down sharply from 9.7 to 1.8%. After a sharp 
decline in inflation, the CNB aggressively tried to reduce the interest rate.140 As a result 
of this strict monetary policy, inflation fell to an average rate of only 1.8% in 1999. 
However, the inflation rate more than doubled in the following year mostly due to an 
increase in commodity prices. 
2. Economic Growth 
The economic growth of all the Visegrad countries after the fall of communism 
was negative. Among them, only Poland was able to improve the negative growth rate in 
1992. Since then Poland has maintained the highest economic growth rate. Two years 
later the other countries were also able to reach and maintain a positive growth rate. 
However, the Czech Republic was not able to sustain positive economic growth and in 
1998 was again in the red.  
The introduction of transition reforms in 1991 culminated in an economic decline 
in the former Czechoslovakia. In the Czech Republic, GDP growth reached -14.2 % and 
in the Slovak Republic -14.6%. The economy began to recover during the next two years, 
but still remained in the red. In 1993, after the separation, the economic growth was -
0.5% in the Czech Republic and -4.1% in Slovakia. The economic situation improved in 
1994, when an increase in exports due to more a competitive exchange rate caused the 
                                                 
139 Ibid., pp. 2-3. The stabilization program included a basket-pegged exchange rate, tight fiscal 
policy and wage discipline. 
140 Ibid., pp. 11-12. Inflation targeting is “a monetary policy characterized by the public 
announcement of official inflation rate targets over a specific time horizon. The ultimate goal of inflation 
targeting is to reduce inflation uncertainty. Inflation uncertainty is costly. It exacerbates the volatility of 
relative prices and increases the risk of financial instruments and contracts set in nominal terms. By making 
explicit the central bank's medium-term policy intentions, inflation targets reduce volatility in financial 
markets, improve planning in the private sector, enhance the public debate about the direction of the 
monetary policy, and increase the accountability of the central bank.” 
50 
GDP to grow at a rate of 2.7% in 1994 and 5% in 1995. The recovery in growth was 
simultaneously accompanied by: (a) a decline in unemployment which dropped below 
3% by the end of 1995, (b) significant accomplishments in privatization, (c) a decline in 
the inflation rate to below 10%, (d) a temperate current account deficit, and (e) balanced 
fiscal accounts.141 It seemed that the government overcame the structural reforms. 
Therefore, many people considered this to be a transition miracle.  
Several reasons caused the so-called miracle to stumble in May 1997. The 
economic slowdown caused by: (a) a currency crisis, (b) heavy floods in significant areas 
of Moravia, (c) a decline in consumer’s confidence,142 (d) an economic slowdown in 
Germany which is the Czech Republic’s largest trading partner, (e) bad financial 
management, (f) and an intensified political crisis.  The political crisis arouse from the 
suspicion of corruption tied to the leading political party (Civic Democratic Party) headed 
by Prime Minister Václav Klaus, who was forced by other political parties to resign in 
November 1997.143 
During 1997-1998, Czech economic performance was a real disappointment. It 
was apparent that reforms adopted by the post communist government had been deficient 
and unable to maintain sustainable economic growth. 144 The Czech Republic had been 
facing its first post-transition recession accompanied by increased unemployment, 
unsustainable current account balances, large current deficits and external speculative 
attacks on the currency. This unfavorable situation forced the temporary government to 
adopt strict fiscal and monetary policies.145 In early 1998, the CNB introduced new 
monetary procedures to target inflation.  
                                                 
141 Ibid., pp. 2-3. At the same time most transitional economies had experienced high unemployment 
rates around 7 to 15%.  
142 Ibid., p. 9. The heavy flooding lowered the output growth by an estimated 0.5 percentage point. 
The growth in private consumption fell from 7% in 1996 to 2.1% in 1997.  
143 When Václav Klaus resigned, the President Václav Havel had appointed a temporary government, 
which governed until a new government had been created from the general election in mid 1998. 
144 The economic growth was negative during 1997-1998. The growth rate declined to –0.8% in 1997 
and in the next year reached –1.2%. 
145 Ibid., p. 95. The international financial community helped to trigger the currency crisis of April-
May 1997.  
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Figure 2.   Real GDP Growth Rate in the Visegrad Countries. 
From: World Bank 1999 and EU 1999-2001 
 
The new regular government led by Miloš Zeman struggled with deficit budgets 
that had been approved by Parliament for the fiscal years 1999 and 2000.146 In addition, 
the new government introduced less restrictive fiscal policies and monetary policies that 
helped to improve the process of structural reforms. In the second quarter of 1999, the 
Czech economy started to recover when GDP growth resumed.  In the next year, 
economic growth reached 2.9% of the GDP.147  
In the early years of reforms, Slovakia followed a path very similar to the 
neighboring countries surrounding the Czech Republic. In 1993, the Slovak economy was 
very slowly recovering from transition reforms that had been adopted. Its growth was -
4.9%. The next year, the growth rate outperformed the Czech growth rate and reached 
4.8%. The growth rate in Slovakia in 1995 culminated in 7% and remained quite stable 
for the next two years at 6.2%. In 1998, it declined to 4.1% and the following years 
stabilized around 2%.  
                                                 
146 Ibid., p. 15. The Czech Parliament approved the state budget for 1999 with a deficit of 2% in the 
GDP to avoid the buildup of hidden liabilities.  
147 This recovery was driven by external demand mainly from the EU and private consumption. See a 
“Regular Report on the Czech Republic’s Progress Toward Accession: 2000,” Commission of the 
European Communities, November 8, 2000, Available [Online], 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/czech/>, p. 28.  
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All Visegrad countries experienced a deep recession in the early stages of their 
transition. Denizer pointed out that the cumulative output in the Visegrad countries 
declined approximately by 20% between 1989 and 1994.148 This recession originated 
primarily from: (a) the collapse of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) 
and its trade arrangements, (b) price and trade liberalization, and (c) reductions in 
subsidies. The Czech and Slovak Republic as well as Hungary began to recover from the 
early recession in 1993-94. In contrast, Poland experienced the best growth rate. Since 
1992, the economic growth in Poland has remained positive up to the end of the last 
decade as a result of advancing reforms. Its growth rate culminated in 7% of the GDP in 
1995. Afterwards, economic growth slowed but still remained higher than 4% of the 
GDP.  
The Hungarian economy had been recovering longer. Since 1994, its growth rate 
fluctuated between 4-5% with the exception of 1996 when it experienced a growth rate of 
1.3% of the GDP. While the other Visegrad economies were able to consolidate their 
recovery in the following years, Hungary experienced a sharp slowdown. During 1995-
1996, Hungary had the poorest macroeconomic performance among the Visegrad 
countries with the highest rates of inflation and the lowest rates of output growth. 149 This 
slowdown was caused by the adjustment measures adopted by the Hungarian government 
in 1995.  
3. Unemployment 
The so-called Czech miracle, economic transformation with low unemployment 
and inflation, and mass privatization was seen as a transition pattern to follow. The 
recovery in growth between 1993-95 was accompanied by a decline in the already low 
rate of unemployment that was below 4% as well as by a drop in the inflation rate below 
10%. Few skeptics were suspicious as the unemployment rate seemed extremely low 
when compared to the other transitional countries and the major banks remained in state 
hands and experienced problems with loans. There were doubts about the effectiveness of 
                                                 
148 Cevdet Denizer, “Stabilization, Adjustment and Growth Prospects in Transition Economies,” 
World Bank Working Paper No. 1955, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, February 1997, p. 6. 
149 A World Bank Country Study, No. 19923, “Hungary on the Road to the European Union,” 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank, November 1999, pp. 19-20.  
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corporate governance by investment funds.150 In addition, real wages increased above the 
productivity growth by 31% between 1991-1992. However, the increase, driven by the 
state sector, did not significantly affect the unemployment rate.151 
The unemployment rate in the Czech Republic grew less than in the other 
Visegrad countries. During 1990-1991, it grew by 4%. Between 1992-1996, 
unemployment fluctuated between 2.6 and 4%. The series of worsening fiscal, economic 
and political conditions caused unemployment to increase. By the end of 1998, 
unemployment had increased to 6.5%. This trend continued in the following years with 
unemployment rate reaching 8.7% in 1999 and 8.8% in 2000. In some regions, such as 
North Bohemia and North Moravia, the unemployment rates reached 15%.152 However, it 
was still lower than in Poland and Slovakia. Unemployment started to fall at the end of 
2000. The average unemployment rate was 8.8%, but was higher for women at a rate of 
10.5% and for young people at 17% than for men, which was at 7.3%. Unemployment 
affected the less skilled and educated people more.153 During the economic recovery, 
direct foreign investment supported job creation and helped offset the increase of 
unemployment due to restructuring. 
Among the Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic enjoyed the lowest registered 
unemployment rate since 1989 to 1994. The unemployment rate in Poland, Hungary and 
the Slovak Republic was significantly higher. What is the explanation for the reverse 
situation in the Czech Republic? Low unemployment resulted from: (a) a lack of 
restructuring in privatized firms, (b) heavy state involvement in banks, (c) conflicts of 
interests created by investment funds, (d) a deficiency in the functioning of bankruptcy 
mechanisms, (e) non-transparent and non-regulated capital markets, and (f) fraud by 
managers and investment funds (assets stripping). In addition, labor productivity lagged 
                                                 
150 A World Bank Country Study, No. 19650,  “Czech Republic: Toward EU Accession, Main 
Report”, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999, p. 4. 
151 Ibid., p. 6.  
152 See a “Regular Report on the Czech Republic’s Progress Toward Accession: 1999, Commission of 
the European Communities, October 13, 1999, Available [Online], 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/czech/>, p. 19.  
153 See a “Regular Report on the Czech Republic’s Progress Toward Accession: 2001,” Commission 
of the European Communities, November 13, 2001, Available [Online], 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/czech/>, pp. 31 and 68. 
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behind wage growth during 1993-1997 and productivity in Poland and Hungary. 154 The 
explanation could be that the voucher privatization method allowed the fast transfer of 
ownership but did not lead to significant structural changes in newly privatized firms.   
 















































Figure 3.   Registered Unemployment in the Visegrad Countries between 1990-2000. 
Source: World Bank 1999 and EU 1998-2001. 
 
4. Foreign Direct Investments (FDI)    
It was important for the Visegrad countries to attract foreign investors. The extent 
of direct foreign investment is depicted in Figure 4. There are two distinct periods in 
which there was a flow of direct foreign investments into the Visegrad countries. In the 
first period, 1991-1997, Hungary was the most successful among the Visegrad countries 
in attracting foreign investments by absorbing almost half of all foreign capital invested 
in Central Europe.155 There are two peaks when the Hungarian government rapidly 
increased the inflow of foreign assets. The first was in 1993 and the second, in 1995, was 
significantly stronger due to progress in privatization through direct sale. By the end of 
1997, the state assets sold in privatization amounted to HUF 790 billion.156 In contrast, 
in the Slovak Republic and Poland, the flow was below 1% of the GDP. Direct foreign 
                                                 
154 A World Bank Country Study, No. 19650,  “Czech Republic: Toward EU Accession, Main 
Report”, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999, p. 137. 
155 A World Bank Country Study, No. 19923, “Hungary on the Road to the European Union,” 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank, November 1999, p. 2.  
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investments started to increase more rapidly in 1996, and the flow reached 3.1% in 
Poland and 1.8% in Slovakia.  


















































Figure 4.   Foreign Direct Investments in Central Europe. 
From:  World Bank 1999, EU2001 
 
The Czech Republic followed a pattern very similar to Hungary, but with a 
smaller inflow of investments. During 1991-1997, the flow into the Czech Republic 
fluctuated around 2% of the GDP with two exceptions. In 1992, foreign investments 
almost reached 4% of the GDP and in 1995 peaked at 5% of the GDP. These flows were 
mainly driven by medium and long term credits. The inflow of foreign capital and wage 
increases stimulated an increase in domestic demand. As a result, the economy 
overheated and the current account deteriorated. During 1996-97, the CNB lost its 
international reserves due to speculative attacks that led to exchanges of foreign currency 
assets for domestic currency assets.  
During the second period, 1998-2000, direct foreign investments in Hungary were 
relatively stable but were declining from 4% to 2.9% of the GDP.  The inflows mainly 
represented investments in new production facilities as the privatization process neared 
                                                 
156 A World Bank Country Study, No. 19923, “Hungary on the Road to the European Union,” 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank, November 1999, p. 4.  
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completion. Only a very few large enterprises were left for sale.157 At the same time, the 
inflow of investment into Poland increased from 4% to 5.3% of the GDP. A large share 
of investments was because of privatization. The struggle to complete the current 
privatization program also attracted more investments in new production capacities.158 
The flow was more moderate in Slovakia but in 2000 the flow climbed to 10.8% of the 
GDP ($1.1 billion) due to privatization through the direct sale of firms with strategic 
importance such as Slovak Telecom, Slovnaft and VSŽ. 159 
Meanwhile, the Czech Republic attracted a significantly higher inflow of 
investments than its neighbors. This trend of high inflows was caused by: (a) increased 
investment incentives introduced in 1998 and made uniform by law since 2000, (b) 
renewed privatization efforts, and (c) the economic recovery. In 1999, the flow peaked at 
11.6% of the GDP. The Czech Republic received almost $20 billion of the foreign 
investments since 1989, but about one half of these investments were invested during 
1999-2000.160 There have been significant investment inflows in the banking sector due 
to the privatization of large banks and industrial companies. This trend is expected to 
continue in 2001-2002 partly due to renewed privatization efforts that include the direct 
sale of the telecommunications and energy companies.    
5. Current Account 
During 1993-2000 the current account in the Visegrad countries fluctuated 
between +5 to –11.2 % of the GDP. Only in the Czech Republic was the current account 
positive in 1993. However, in the next year, the current account shifted from a surplus to 
a deficit and remained there to the end of the last decade. The level of the deficit 
remained moderate to the GDP. It gave the impression that the country had entered a 
                                                 
157  See an EBRD Investment Profile, “Hungary Investment Profile,” London: European Bank for 
Research and Development (EBRD), April 2001, Available [Online], 
<http://www.mac.doc.gov/eebic/countryr/hungary.htm>, p. 6. 
158 See an EBRD Investment Profile, “Poland Investment Profile,” London: European Bank for 
Research and Development (EBRD), April 2001, Available [Online], 
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159 See an EBRD Investment Profile, “Slovak Republic Investment Profile,” London: European Bank 
for Research and Development (EBRD), April 2001, Available [Online], 
http://www.mac.doc.gov/eebic/countryr/slovakr.htm, p. 6. 
160See an EBRD Investment Profile, “Czech Republic Investment Profile,” London: European Bank 
for Research and Development (EBRD), April 2001, Available [Online], 
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sustainable period of high growth. During 1996-1997, the CNB international reserves 
decreased due to speculative attacks on the Czech currency. The CNB reacted with a 
number of policy options to prevent the overheating of the economy: (a) exchanging 
foreign currency assets for domestic assets, (b) restrictions on short-term flows, and (c) 
an increase in the exchange rate band.161 However, it was not successful in sustaining the 
exchange rate level. The reserve losses were accompanied by an increasing current 
account deficit, which peaked in 1996 at 7.4% of the GDP. The lack of credibility in 
sustaining the exchange rate led to a boom in consumption. As a result, the exchange rate 
regime collapsed.162     













































Figure 5.   Current Account Balance in the Visegrad Countries. 
Source: World Bank 1999, EU 2001 
 
The current account deficit narrowed to 2.4% of the GDP in 1998 as a result of a 
prudent monetary policy. The Czech Republic had been facing recession with a decline in 
output by 2.3% in 1998 and with glum prospects of economic growth in the next year. In 
addition, unemployment had doubled and climbed to over 8% in the first half of 1999.163 
In 1999, the current account started to increase again and in the following year the deficit 
reached 4.8% of the GDP. 
                                                 
161 A World Bank Country Study, No. 19650,  “Czech Republic: Toward EU Accession, Main 
Report”, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999, p. 4. 
162 Ibid., p. 19.  
163 Ibid., p. 1.   
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The Hungarian economy began to recover from the transition recession in 1993 
and 1994. The recovery was accompanied by a significant increase in the external debt 
and by a sharp rise in the current account deficit to 9.5%% of the GDP in 1994. The 
country suffered from a loss in creditworthiness due to large fiscal imbalances and slow 
privatization. In March 1995, the Hungarian government adopted a drastic stabilization 
program to avoid a potential crisis in the balance of payments.164 This program has 
shown impressive results. Economic growth has accelerated while the current account 
deficit and external debt sharply declined. In 1997, the current account deficit declined to 
–2.2%. However, in the following year, it more than doubled. During 1999-2000 the 
current account recovered slightly.  
During 1993-199 the Polish government managed to keep the current account 
balance under control. However, during the second half of 1997 the Polish trade and 
current account deficits started to increase due to the Russian crisis. Poland’s current 
account deficit expanded from –1% in 1996 to –8.1% in 1999. The Polish government 
had to undertake fiscal consolidation. Whereas exports increased and foreign direct 
investments remained high due to the privatization of large enterprises, an increase in 
imports was more robust due to the rapid increase in domestic demand.165 
The Slovak Republic had the most fluctuating current account balance among the 
Visegrad countries. The separation of the former Czechoslovakia caused a deficit in the 
current account balance of 5% of the GDP. The following years saw positive results. 
During 1996-1998, the Slovak government was challenged by high current account and 
government budget deficits and macroeconomic and structural problems.  The 
government’s stabilization policies generated the desired results in the following years of 
1999-2000. As a result, the trade and current account deficits were brought under control.   
 
 
                                                 
164 The stabilization program included: (a) a strong fiscal adjustment, with an initial sharp exchange 
rate depreciation, followed by a declining devaluation to control inflation and (b) a wage restraint, with a 
decline of real wages by 9 and 3% in 1995 and 1996. See A World Bank Country Study, No. 19923, 
“Hungary on the Road to the European Union,” Washington D.C.; The World Bank, November 1999, p. 4.  
165 See a ”Regular Report on Poland’s Progress Toward Accession: 2000,” Co mmission of the 
European Communities, November 8, 2000, Available [Online], 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/poland/index.htm>, p. 22. 
59 
B. INDICATORS OF TRANSITION 
At the start of the transition process, the main goal of all Visegrad countries was 
stabilization, liberalization, and privatization with a big bang.  The pace was important to 
shorten the period of social consequences of the transition. All Visegrad countries 
managed to liberalize and stabilize their economies before 1993.166 However, the pace 
and progress differed. The Czechoslovak rapid strategy of liberalization helped it to catch 
up to Poland and Hungary. In 1995, the Czech Republic achieved a moderate advantage 
in terms of the progress in liberalization.  
The Czech and Slovak Republics started with almost non-existent private sectors. 
In contrast, the private sector was more developed in Poland and Hungary. The Czech 
Republic’s rapid privatization strategy was a counter-example to the moderate and 
evolutionary strategy implemented in Poland and Hungary. The mass privatization 
method implemented in the Czech and Slovak Republics was effective in quickly 
converting state assets to private hands. The implementation of two waves of 
privatization through the voucher method helped the Czech Republic advance faster with 
privatization. However, after a quick start, privatization in the Czech Republic faltered 
and a large amount of assets remained in state hands. A new wave of rapid progress in 
privatization began once again at the end of the last decade. The Czech government 
encouraged privatization through the direct sale of state assets. This has helped to bring 
privatization closer to an end. However, the evolutionary Hungarian approach showed 
that the moderate speed of privatization in Hungary led to faster privatization in the end.  
1. Price and Trade Liberalization 
All Visegrad countries undertook price and trade liberalization reforms at a 
different pace. At the start of privatization, the Czech and Slovak Republics were 
significantly behind Hungary and Poland in terms of price liberalization. The experiments 
with liberalization in Hungary began in the 1960s. Private agents freely set about 60 and 
70% of the retail prices, when the communist regime fell. 
                                                 
166 See Gomulka, Stanislav. “Ten Years in Retrospect: Secrets of Successful Macroeconomic 
Policies,” Transition Newsletter, The World Bank/The William Davidson Institute, Vol. 11, No. 5, August-
October 2000, p. 18.   
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The price adjustments were linked to the convertible currency for goods traded on 
the foreign markets. The price liberalization initiated a boom in private commercial 
establishments. However, the communist government did not allow private entrepreneurs 
to enter into wholesale and foreign trade.167 At the start of transformation, Hungary 
differed from the Czech Republic. There were a significant number of private 
establishments already in existence. This had a significant impact on the consumer 
sector.168  
The goal of the liberalization and stabilization programs in the Visegrad countries 
was to achieve stabilization and liberalization imprints, move from state controlled and 
regulated prices toward free market prices, and disconnect the state monopoly over 
foreign trade at the same time. This policy incorporated unilateral liberalization and 
bilateral free trade agreements with the most important trading partners, including the 
European Union (EU) and the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). The 
goal was to remove central control over prices and trade and begin to create a free 
market.  
The liberalization programs included: (a) liberalization of wages, (b) liberalization 
of prices, (c) tariff reductions, (d) removal of non-tariff barriers, and (e) reorientation of 
the foreign trade from East to West. The degree of protection for domestic production 
significantly declined to the level comparable to EU countries. It was accompanied by a 
strong currency devaluation, which helped reorient trade from the former socialist 
markets to the Western markets, and mainly to the EU countries. The trade expansion to 
the EU countries had been triggered by the collapse of the CMEA and by the 
liberalization of trade and exchange rates. The main feature of liberalization was the 
adoption of policies intended to affect fiscal accounts. As a result, all Visegrad countries 
went through a sharp recession followed eventually by a recovery in all countries.169 
Cata, who examined the transition of the former Soviet block countries, can prove that: 
(a) price decontrol had a substantial and temporary effect on the price level; (b) price 
                                                 
167 See a World Bank, Discussion Paper, No. 104, “Eastern European Experience with Small-Scale 
Privatization”, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, April 1994, p. 49.  
168 Ibid., p. 3. 
169 A World Bank country study, No. 19650,  “Czech Republic: Toward EU Accession, Main Report”, 
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999, p. 13. 
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decontrol has no lasting adverse effect on the rate of inflation; and (c) monetary 
expansion has been the fundamental determinant of inflation. 170  
The Hungarian post-communist government relaxed the state monopoly on 
foreign trade in January 1990. The value of exports to the EU countries in Hungary 
increased by 76% between 1989 and 1992. In 1989, the EU market accounted for 34% of 
Hungarian exports. In two years, the EU share of trade increased to 50%. This expansion 
trend slowed down in 1993, when the value of the EU-oriented exports fell by 12%. By 
the end of 1997, exports to the EU countries reached 70%.171  
Czechoslovakia began the transition towards a free market by launching a 
stabilization and transformation program in 1991. The success in liberalization and small-
scale privatization helped the Czech and Slovak Republics to reach the same level as 
Poland and Hungary. After a large jump in 1991, the liberalization process in the Czech 
and Slovak Republics slowed down and only moderate improvements can be seen. 
Moreover, significant differences among the Visegrad countries in price liberalization 
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Table 6.   Progress in Liberalization. 
 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
Czech 
Republic 
 0.16  0.79  0.86  0.9  0.9  0.93 
Hungary  0.57  0.74  0.78  0.82  0.86  0.93 
Poland  0.68  0.72  0.82  0.82  0.86  0.89 
Slovak 
Republic  0.16  0.79  0.86  0.86  0.86  0.86 
From: Denizer 1997 
 
2. Progress in Privatization 
The main reason for the economic failure of the socialist system was the 
inefficiency of the state owned firms. The transitional economies of the Visegrad 
countries had to restructure and privatize on a large scale. It was hoped that privatization 
would contribute to the restructuring and improvement of productivity of state owned 
enterprises. The immediate negative consequence of reforms was a large decline in 
output and employment.  
In the former Czechoslovakia, almost entire industrial assets were in state hands. 
Privatization through public offerings in the Visegrad countries was not feasible since 
private savings were not adequate enough to acquire immense industrial assets at market 
prices. The pace was important in order to avoid the stripping of assets from firms 
waiting for privatization. First, the solution was to sell state assets to foreign investors, 
which was not politically desirable at the start of privatization in the Visegrad countries 
with the exception of Hungary, which had been willing to sell a significant portion of 
state owned assets to foreign investors. The second solution, the management and 
employee buyouts, had been an important element in Polish privatization. The third 
feasible approach was restitution to the former owners. This method played an important 
role in the privatization in Visegrad countries with the exception of Hungary, where 
restitution took the form of government bonds. The Hungarian approach was more 
complex and slowed down the pace of privatization. The fourth solution was mass 
privatization. Other countries, with the exception of Hungary, implemented mass 
privatization methods. The main goal of the Polish government was to prevent the 
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emergence of dispersed ownership. In contrast, the Czechoslovak approach led to some 
extent to the spontaneous concentration of ownership by investment funds.173 
 
Table 7.   Progress in Privatization174. 
 
  1990  1992  1994 
Czech 
Republic  0.4  0.8  0.9 
Hungary  0.3  0.6  0.8 
Poland  0.5  0.7  0.8 
Slovak 
Republic  0.4  0.8  0.8 
 
Source: Estrin (1996) 
 
3. Private Sector  
a. Private Sector Development 
From the beginning, private sector development has been an essential 
component of transition in all Visegrad countries. To promote private sector 
development, the Visegrad countries adopted profound liberalization and privatization 
programs, and stimulated enterprise development. In all Visegrad countries, the private 
sector share in employment, private sector production, investments and trade has 
noticeably increased in the last decade. The private sectors in the Visegrad countries 
currently generate about 70-83% of the GDP compared to 4-28% in 1989.  
At the beginning of structural reforms, Poland had a considerable 
agricultural and private sector, which accounted for approximately 28% of the economy. 
In contrast, the private sector in the Czech Republic was almost non-existent and 
generated only 4% of the GDP. Slovakia started a little bit better where the private sector 
share accounted for 10% of the economy. At the same time, the private sector in Hungary 
                                                 
173 Saul Estrin, “Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe.” London: London Business School and 
Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, March 1996, Available [Online], 
<http://www.hw.ac.uk/ecoWWW/cert/wpa/1996/dp9605.pdf>, pp. 1-11. 
174 De Mello reported on the World Bank indicators on the progress in privatization in Eastern Europe. 
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the privatization index reached at least 0.8 in 1994. Ibid., p. 14.  
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generated 20% of the GDP. Since the beginning of the transition process, the private 
sector has continued to contribute more. 
The Czech Republic experienced the fastest growing private sector among 
the Visegrad countries as a result of the faster pace of privatization, but also due to the 
mushrooming of new small businesses. This favorable trend has continued in other 
countries. At the end of 1994, the private sector accounted for more than 50% of the 
economy in all Visegrad countries.175 The private sector share in the Czech economy 
reached 66.5% of the GDP in 1995. At the same time, it rose to 59% in Poland, to 62% in 
Slovakia and to 65% in Hungary. The share of the private sector further increased in the 
region.  






































Figure 6.   The Private Sector's Share of GDP in the Visegrad Countries. 
From: World Bank 1996, EU 1998-2001 
 
The Visegrad countries developed a strong private sector during the last 
decade. The private sector plays an essential role in their strategies for achieving 
sustainable economic growth. The private sector has been growing at the slowest rate in 
Poland, where it accounted for 70% of the GDP in 2000. At the same time, in all other 
Visegrad countries, the private sector rose to 80% of the GDP. 
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b. Private Sector Employment 
After the fall of the communist regimes, private sector employment was 
low, about 10-20%, with the exception of Poland where employment in the private sector 
was relatively high at 47%.176 In 1995, employment in private sector increased to 55-
75%. Three years later in the Czech Republic, employment in the private sector reached 
77.8%.177 A significant part of this growth came from privatization, particularly in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic. However, it was also from newly 
established enterprises having no ties to former state enterprises. New businesses in the 
region are often small, self-employed and operate in the service sector and generate 
higher profit margins than the former state-owned firms.  



































Figure 7.   The Private Sector's Employment in the Visegrad Countries. 
From: Borish & Noel 1996 
 
4. What Left for Privatization? 
a. Czech Republic 
At the start of the transition process, the Czech Republic performed better 
than other transitional countries. The Czech government had started the privatization 
process with small scale privatization that was successfully accomplished in 1993. It was 
                                                 
176 Michael S. Borish and Michael Noel, “Private Sector Development during Transition: The 
Visegrad countries,” Washington D.C.: The World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 318, February 1996, p. 1.  
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followed by the voucher privatization program that led to the quick privatization of a 
large number of enterprises. By 1995, the Czech Republic led in terms of the private 
sector share, which approached 66.5% of the GDP. At the end of 1997, the privatized 
assets of medium and large enterprises were approximately CZK700 billion and the total 
revenues from privatization by all methods reached CZK176 billion. Revenues from 
small-scale privatization accounted for 23% of collected revenue. In 1996, the revenues 
from sales to foreign investors accounted for only 3-4%.178  
Rapid and extensive privatization accounted for much of this change. 
However, there were doubts as to whether the new owners, particularly the investment 
funds, would actively exercise corporate governance and drive restructuring. In addition, 
the regulatory framework for enterprises and capital market institutions contained flaws 
that hindered the expected gains from privatization. Furthermore, there was less progress 
in privatizing the state banks and solving the problem of bad debts. These deficiencies led 
later to the worsening macroeconomic performance and crisis in 1997.  
At the start of the reforms, the voucher privatization method encouraged 
the privatization process. However, afterwards the Czechs government slowed the pace 
of privatization and shifted to a direct sale method of privatization by using cash or case-
by-case methods. A large amount of strategic assets had been waiting for privatization. 
The state kept a majority stake in a set of 40 strategic firms and banks, and stakes in more 
than 30 non-strategic companies, and minority stakes in about 300 firms. The estimated 
state’s share in SPT Telecom is CZK74 billion, in Ceské Radiokomunikace CZK 9 
billion, in CEZ CZK33 billion and in the regional power and gas distribution companies 
CZK30 billion. 179 The Czech government decided to sell its share in 236 non strategic 
holdings where its share was less then 5% for approximately CZK8 billion. 180    
Bank privatization proceeded very slowly up to the end of 1997. Five 
state-owned banks (KB, ŽB, CS, IPB, and CSOB) were partially privatized through the 
voucher method. In 1992, the first state-owned bank, ŽB, was fully privatized. The first 
                                                 
178 A World Bank Country Study, No. 19650, “Czech Republic: Toward EU Accession, Main 
Report”, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999, pp. 142-143. 
179 Ibid., p. 143.  
180 Ibid., p. 144.  
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major bank privatization (IPB) began in 1996.181 In 1997, the state stakes in the banking 
sector remained still high with the Czech Savings Bank at 45.0%, Komercní Banka at 
48.7% and CSOB at 65.7%.182 Privatization of the IPB was accomplished in March 1998 
when the IPB bank was sold to the Nomura Bank.183 At the same time, total state 
ownership in the banking sector accounted for 84% of the banking sector.184 The 
privatization process for the three major banks KB, CSOB and CS started in 1999. 
During 1999-2000, the market share of the foreign-owned banks was expected to increase 
to about 90%.185 
 
Table 8.   The Unfinished Privatization Agenda in the Czech Republic (June 30, 1998). 
 
State assets  Book Value  Market 
Value 
 Number of 
(Held by)  (CZK mil.)  (CZK mil.)  Companies 
National Property Fund       
Strategic companies  155,463  202,821  40 
None strategic companies  15,285  5,032  329 
Restitution Investment Fund  1,243  1,161  1 
Other property  3,941    569 
National Property Fund  170,748  207,853  369 
Ceská Financní  13,942  4,000  Over 60 
Konsolidacni Banka  11,318  6,000  9 
 
From: World Bank 1999 
 
In 1999, the Czech Republic accelerated structural reforms, and 
privatization activities were under review. The foreign direct investments in 1999 were 
significantly influenced by the sale of CSOB to a foreign bank for over € 1 billion. 186 In 
June 2000, the state sold its 30% share in Škoda Auto and the Ceská Sporitelna Bank for 
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€ 515 million. 187 At the end of June 2001, with the sale of Komercní Banka, the 
privatization of the banking sector was completed. Foreign banks controlled about 90% 
of the banking sector. The take-over of IPB by CSOB, after IPB had been put into forced 
administration, has still not been completely settled.188 The Government approved the 
sale of its 30% stake in Ceská Pojištovna, the country’s largest insurance company.189 
The privatization of large enterprises in the energy, engineering and telecommunications 
sector has been scheduled for 2001 and 2002.190  
b. Hungary 
The privatization process in Hungary has been proceeding slowly. By mid 
1995, only 35% of state assets had been sold. Running disputes delayed the privatization 
process. Moreover, the Privatization Law excluded major utilities from privatization.191 
Privatization through direct sale peaked in the second half of 1995. At the end of 1995, 
the revenue from privatization amounted to HUF 178,388 mil. In the following year, it 
peaked at HUF 260,621 mil. By the end of 1997, the privatized assets accounted for HUF 
790 billion and the shares transferred to the social security funds and municipalities were 
worth HUF 65 billion. 192 The Hungarian parliament decided to retain a stake in 116 
companies.193 At the end of 1998, the state held stakes in 388 firms of which 150 were 
undergoing bankruptcy proceedings. In 1999, the state sold a 5.7% minority stake in 
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MATAV for € 300.2 million,  194 and the remaining stakes were in a number of financial 
institutions. However, it was decided to keep minority stakes in privatized companies.  
The state still holds assets with a book value of € 3.4 billion, and 
maintains a majority ownership in 134 enterprises, compared to 1,859 firms with state 
ownership in 1990. The state has been preparing for the privatization of the 
pharmaceuticals retailer Hungaropharma and the largest steel enterprise Danaher.195 At 
the end of 1999, the private sector accounted for over 80% of the GDP. In 2000, 
privatization was almost completed. Only a few large firms remained for direct sale.196 
Most of the privatization projects have been postponed, such as the national airline 
MALEV, due to the unfavorable stock exchange environment and further restructuring 
needs. Other firms, such as Postabank, have been reclassified as strategic. The banking 
sector is mainly private.197 
c. Poland 
Privatization and structural reforms have been slowly progressing in 
Poland. The Polish government expected the total revenue from the privatization 
program, which encompassed about 1,800 companies, to amount to ECU 25 billion. 198 In 
1998, the Polish authorities decided that 44 enterprises would remain under state 
ownership and that 70% of state assets were to be privatized by 2001, and would collect 
revenue of more than € 35 billion. By the end of 1998, approximately 3,000 firms were 
still to be privatized and around half of them through the direct sales method. In 1998, the 
number of privatized firms through direct sale reached 156, through commercialization 
244, and by tender 16. The sale of 15% of the shares of Poland’s national 
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telecommunications operator TPSA has generated revenue over € 765 million. 
“Privatization revenue of € 1.9 billion in 1998 exceeded expectations. The sale of about 
70 firms in 1999 is expected to contribute € 3.6 billion to government revenue.”199  
In 1999, the pace of privatization was encouraging. The number of sold 
enterprises reached 150 across a wide range of sectors. Revenues from privatization 
exceeded expectations.200 The next year the number of privatized firms through direct 
sale reached 165. Revenues from privatization were used to finance four large social 
reforms. Revenues from privatization significantly affected the inflows of foreign 
investment that amounted to € 9bn or slightly less than in 1999.201 The state still owns a 
major share in a number of firms in sectors such as steel, energy, gas, oil, 
telecommunications, heavy chemical industry, air transport, railways, spirits and sugar.202 
The Polish government expects that privatization will be completed by the end of 2002. 
d. Slovak Republic 
The privatization process in Slovakia started with small scale privatization 
that generated $0.5 billion. The first wave of voucher privatization helped to accelerate 
privatization in Slovakia and convert state assets worth $38 billion to private hands.203 
There are two reasons why Slovakia lagged behind in the pace of privatization. First, 
after separation, the second round of voucher privatization, which was expected to 
privatize state assets with a book value of $6.5 billion, was abandoned. The government 
led by Vladimir Meciar had started to privatize manufacturing firms through public 
tenders to owners politically connected to the leading political party at very low prices 
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and with long payment periods. 204 Second, the Slovak government was unable to attract 
an inflow of foreign direct investments. During 1993-1994, the flow of direct investments 
accounted for only $240 million. 205  
In 1998, Slovakia made notable progress in restructuring and privatization 
through direct sale. Stakes in several industrial firms, strategic enterprises in banking and 
telecommunication sectors mainly, have been sold at preferential rates. However, in 
many cases, there was a lack of transparency and fairness. The lack of foreign direct 
investments, the government’s interventions, and inefficiency in the privatization process 
negatively affected the enterprise restructuring process. In addition, the government 
exerted significant influence over the economy by excluding some essential firms from 
privatization. 206  
In 1999, new political representation focused on the program of structural 
reforms and privatization of banks and enterprises. The new government decided to 
review the privatization process of some enterprises due to a lack of transparency and the 
suspicion of corruption. Although no dominant privatization has been completed, the new 
government launched a plan for the privatization of the telecommunication, utility and 
banking sectors. The state owned bank’s share was still high and was 46% of the banking 
sector. The parliament abolished the Act that prevented the privatization of strategic 
enterprises207 
Privatization in Slovakia advanced further in 2000. The government sold 
its majority stake in Slovak Telecom. 208 The full privatization of the state banks is almost 
completed and the sale of minority stakes in the utility sector is still being prepared. Due 
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to the sale of the state’s majority stake in Slovak Telecom and minority stakes in Slovnaft 
and VSŽ, foreign investments amounted to $1.1 billion in 2000. Within 1990-2000, the 
accumulated foreign direct investment stock reached $3.6 billion. 209 Slovakia made 
significant progress in the privatization of the banking sector in 2001. The government 
sold its majority stakes in the largest banks and advanced in the privatization of the 
largest insurance company and remaining smaller banks. The private sector share of the 
GDP increased to about 85%.210 The government has accelerated the privatization of 38 
companies for a total accounting value of approximately € 5.8 billion. Privatization in 
Slovakia is almost at an end. 
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V. SUCCESS OR FAILURE 
It is widely recognized that the privatization of state owned enterprises is one of 
the key reforms during the transition process. However, the best arrangement for 
privatization and its advantages and drawbacks is less clear. The voucher method 
implemented by the Czech government became one of the most discussed issues during 
the transition process.  
This chapter provides an overview and current evaluation of the Czech 
privatization approach. The criteria for measuring the success or failure of a particular 
market reform or development are often ignored and unpublished. How successful was 
voucher privatization in the Czech Republic? To answer this question, indicators of 
success or failure assessment need to be introduced.  
This paper introduces some assessment indicators in order to analyze the success 
or failure of voucher privatization. It tries to look at more than one alterna tive 
perspective. To what extent are these indicators relevant? The relevance of the indicators 
is subjective to some extent. However, the success of the voucher scheme in terms of the 
pace and the emergence of the private sector are not in doubt.  
How can success or failure be accessed? The first set of indicators of success or 
failure in privatization is the extent to which the Czech government was able to meet its 
objectives. The voucher scheme was successful in (a) the fast transformation of property 
rights from the state to private owners, (b) gaining wide pubic support for privatization, 
and (c) preventing foreigners from dominating the privatization process. However, it 
failed to accomplish its third objective of improving performance and the governance of 
privatized enterprises in the short run.  
The second group of indicators of success or failure in privatization is the extent 
to which the Czech privatization was able to meet objectives recognized by liberal 
economists. The voucher scheme was successful in (a) private sector development, (b) 
emergence of ownership concentration similar to the United Kingdom, and (c) 
transformation from a command economy to a consolidated market economy. The 
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voucher scheme failed (a) to maximize revenue collection from privatization, (b) had a 
mainly negative impact on efficiency in privatized firms due to delayed structural 
reforms, and (c) failed to implement counter measures against corruption.  
The third set of indicators of success or failure is focused on some of the positive 
and negative outcomes of coupon privatization. The voucher scheme was successful in 
(a) terms of speed of denationalization (b) free distribution of state assets that do not 
unleash hyperinflation, (c) developing a good system for equity distribution, and (d) the 
emergence of a large number of privatization funds.  
In contrast, it failed (a) to follow its original deadline, (b) because the 
implementation of the voucher method lacked transparency, (c) because it provided 
asymmetric information for participants, (d) to be fair concerning the outcomes that 
occurred, and (e) to create regulatory measures against looting, tunneling and other 
undesirable behavior.  
A. THE GOVERNMENT’S MAIN OBJECTIVES 
The first set of indicators of success or failure in privatization is the extent to 
which the Czech government was able to meet its objectives. Statements on expectations 
made by the government were helpful in the process of evaluating success and failure. 
These statements were used as criteria to judge success or failure later. The government’s 
main objectives were (a) attain ownership transformation, (b) gain pubic support for 
privatization, (c) improve economic efficiency, performance and the governance of 
privatized enterprises, and (d) prevent the domination of foreigners in the privatization 
process.  
1. Ownership Transformation  
The first main objective of Czech privatization was to accomplish ownership 
transformation and gain pubic support for privatization. The voucher scheme was 
successful in the quick transformation of property rights from the state to private owners. 
The voucher method made it possible to denationalize a large part of the Czech 
economy in a short period of time. In the first wave of voucher privatization that lasted 
less than one year, 943 state enterprises with a book value of more than 206 billion CZK 
were privatized. In the second wave, additional 867 enterprises with a book value of 155 
75 
billion CZK were privatized. In addition, the coupon method showed that it is feasible 
that an inexperienced government in a single wave could privatize a significant part of 
the economy. The coupon method of privatization fulfilled the Czech government’s 
expectations. In three and half years, starting in October 1991 and ending in March 1995, 
1,810 enterprises were denationalized. The voucher method enabled an enormous number 
of majority shares in a great number of state firms to be quickly sold.  
2. Public Support 
The Czech government was also successful in its objective to gain pubic support 
for privatization. In December 1989, only 22% of the population favored wholesale 
privatization of industry and 13% supported privatization of agriculture.211 The Czech 
government’s goal was to attract at least 50% of its citizens for the first wave of the 
voucher privatization method. The initial public response to the government’s campaign 
was significantly lower. Only about 20% wanted to participate. However, the marketing 
campaign launched by the Investment Privatization Funds rapidly increased the number 
of participants.  
The rapid pace of reform did not encounter any resistance from inexperienced 
citizens since all eligible citizens were able to participate through the coupon method. 
Despite not having any capital, they had an opportunity to participate in privatization. 
The number of participants was high. In the first wave, the number of participants 
increased to 75% of the total number of eligible citizens and in the second wave further 
increased to 80%.212   
The participation of voucher holders in each wave of the five bidding rounds 
exceeded expectations. The number of participants fluctuated between 88-92% of the 
total number of bidders.  Therefore, the voucher method was successful in fulfilling the 
government’s objective to gain public support for radical reforms.  
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3. Governance of Privatized Firms  
The government to some extent failed to accomplish its third objective to improve 
performance and the governance of privatized enterprises. What were the shortcomings 
of the coupon method? The first drawback of the voucher method was that it still resulted 
in continuing state ownership and influence in the banking sector and in privatized firms 
through the investment funds owned by domestic financial institutions. A close 
relationship between banks and enterprises has not been seen as an undesirable conflict of 
interest but as positive monitoring mechanisms to decrease information asymmetries 
between banks and privatized firms. “A necessary precondition for success is to change 
incentives of both banks and enterprises and privatize them.” Once they were privatized 
the “Czech banks started to improve their efficiency.”213 This flaw to some extent 
contributed to the first post-communist recession in 1997. Since that time, the 
government has taken measures to remove the deficiencies in the legislative and legal 
setting, especially in relation to investment funds and capital markets, and has accelerated 
the privatization of the commercial banks.  
The second drawback was the failure to impose adequate constraints and provide 
incentives to the new owners to restructure the newly privatized enterprises. For instance, 
labor productivity in the Czech Republic increased by 6% during 1989-1998, compared 
with 36% in Hungary and 29% in Poland.214  During the voucher privatization process, 
real wages increased by 31% without a significant impact on unemployment. The growth 
of real wages was more significant in State enterprises, but also affected the newly 
privatized enterprises.215 
The Czech approach allowed the fast privatization of state owned enterprises but 
left the restructuring process to the new owners. In contrast, Hungary and Poland 
emphasized active improvement in corporate governance and struggled to restructure 
state-owned enterprises before offering them to new investors.  Hungary preferred, rather, 
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the gains resulting from a higher quality of corporate governance than the rapid pace of 
ownership transfer.216  
The third shortcoming of the coupon method was that it led to disperse ownership 
structures. However, this flaw was eliminated to some extent by the emergence of IPFs 
and their aggressive marketing strategy.  
It was also frequently argued that the voucher privatization would create a 
large number of small and inexperienced owners who would not be in a 
position to exert a sufficiently strong pressure on managers and perform 
the entrepreneurial role in restructuring and modernization of privatized 
firms.217 
The IPFs gained 66% of all shares in the first wave of coupon privatization. 
However, they were limited to 20% ownership and usually owned far less. This 
weakened (a) the role of IPFs representation on boards, (b) their ability to impose their 
interests, and (c) their ability to supervise enterprise management. It also undermined 
their incentives to exercise control over enterprise management. As a result, IPFs became 
portfolio managers focused on aggregate returns.218 Thus, the IPFs did not play the 
expected positive role in improving corporate governance in newly privatized firms. 
The EBRD, in collaboration with the World Bank, conducted a survey focused on 
the quality of governance in 20 transition countries. The survey revealed that the quality 
of corporate governance in the Czech Republic was the worst among the Visegrad 
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Table 9.   The Quality of Governance. 
 
  Micro Economic   Macro Economic   Governance  
Country  Governance  Governance  Index 
Czech Republic   0.8  1.35  1.59 
Hungary  0.92  1.72  1.98 
Poland   0.96  1.53  1.69 
Slovak Republic   0.88  1.68  1.65 
From: The World Bank, 1999 
 
4. Foreign Dominance Prevention  
The Czech government successfully fulfilled its next objective to prevent 
foreigners from dominating the privatization process. The Czech government was 
successful in fulfilling its objective. During the period 1991-97, the direct sales of shares 
of joint stock to foreign investors amounted to 14.15 billion CZK but it was only a 2.73 
share of the total. In small-scale privatization, only 19% of revenues were received from 
foreign investors. Revenues from sales to foreigners decreased from 33-36% in 1992-
1993 to 3-4% in 1996-1997.220 In contrast, Hungary generated substantial FDI through 
privatization during 1995-1996.221 The share of foreign investors in total investment 
reached 62% in 1996.222 The foreign ownership in Hungarian manufacturing firms 
reached 51.1% of the total. 223 Firms with foreign capital generated 73% of total exports 
and 72% of imports in 1997.224  
B. OTHER PRIVATIZATION GOALS   
The second set of indicators of success or failure in privatization is the extent to 
which the Czech privatization was able to meet objectives recognized by liberal 
economists. The next indicators of success or failure are related to the main goals of 
privatization described by Prince Waterhouse. These indicators are (a) revenue collection 
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from privatization, (b) improved efficiency of privatized firms, (c) decrease in the 
government’s involvement in the economy, (d) greater enterprise ownership structure, 
and (e) the emergence of a competitive free market environment.225   
1. Revenue Collection from Privatization 
Revenue collection is one of the main objectives of privatization. Up to the end of 
1997, the Czech government was less successful in revenue collection from privatization 
than Hungary. However, since 1998, the Czech economy has achieved a leading role in 
the region in revenue collection from privatization.  
The Czech government’s main objective was not the maximization of revenue 
collection from mass privatization. However, this changed when the voucher 
privatization process was completed. The total revenues from privatization by all 
methods, mainly when collected from domestic investors, were estimated at CZK176 
billion up to the end of 1997. In contrast, Hungary generated substantial FDI through 
privatization in 1995/96.226 
In 1998/1999, the Czech government accelerated denationalization by privatizing 
the leading banks through tenders and direct sales. This has helped the Czech Republic 
get ahead of its rivals in terms of per capita FDI. This trend of high inflows was mainly 
caused by renewed privatization efforts. In 1999, the flow of FDI peaked at 11.6% of the 
GDP. The Czech Republic has received almost $20 billion in foreign direct investments 
since 1989, but about one half of these investments were invested during 1999-2000.227 
For the year 2002, the estimated flow of FDI is $4.5 billion. The estimated cumulative 
total of FDI since the 1990s to 2002 is more than $26.0 billion. The annual receipts from 
privatization could exceed $4-5 billion in 2002 and 2003. However, after that, the inflows 
are expected to decline as the major privatization process is coming to an end.228  
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2. Improved Efficiency of Privatized Firms  
The second objective of privatization is the improved efficiency of privatized 
firms. The voucher privatization method had a mainly negative impact on efficiency in 
privatized firms due to delayed structural reforms in privatized firms and in the banking 
sector.  
Oswald has evidence that enterprises privatized through the voucher privatization 
method were more profitable than those not privatized in this manner.  “Almost 32% of 
them had been profitable firms. In contrast only 13.4% of them were in loss.”229 
Harper indicated that the voucher privatization method had a mainly negative 
impact on efficiency in privatized firms. Harper analyzed 178 Czech firms that were 
privatized in the first wave of coupon privatization to test profitability and changes in 
efficiency and profitability. His study reveals that efficiency and profitability decreased 
immediately after privatization was completed. His findings are contrary to earlier 
studies. He has evidence that changes in the operations of privatized firms do not vary 
substantially by size or ownership. However, the type of industry impacts the 
performance of the firm. The non-manufacturing firms showed more posit ive, or less, 
negative changes. Despite these negative findings, he found one positive outcome. 
Employment in privatized firms is decreasing. 230  
The delay of structural reforms in the banking and financial sector is one of the 
main reasons for the lack of efficiency in privatized enterprises.231 In the Czech Republic, 
large banks were the founders of the largest IPFs that gained 44% of all coupon points.232 
As a result, banks had excessive economic power over firms and could control firms 
through the shares owned by their funds. Banks, as the institutional owners, have 
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monitored the performance of the firms but they were not experts in enterprise 
management in different industry fields. 
3. Private Sector Development 
The Czech Republic was successful in private sector development. The measure 
of private sector development is the magnitude of the private sector’s share in a country’s 
economy. It is mainly measured by the private sector’s share in (a) employment, (b) 
production, (c) investment (d) consumption and (e) trade. The Czech Republic 
experienced the fastest growing private sector among the Visegrad countries as a result of 
the faster pace of privatization in the earlier years of reforms.  
In 1989, the private sector in the Czech Republic generated only 4% of the GDP. 
The voucher method of privatization significantly helped the country to catch up with the 
others. First, in five years, the private sector represented 56% of the GDP. At the end of 
the voucher privatization process, the private sector’s share in the Czech economy 
reached 66.5% of the GDP compared to 65% in Hungary, 62% in Slovakia and 59% in 
Poland. The Visegrad countries developed a strong private sector during the transition 
process. In 2000, the private sector increased to more than 80% of the GDP in the 
Visegrad countries with the exception of Poland where the private sector accounted for 
70% of the GDP.  
Second, in 1995 the private sector’s share of employment reached 75.5% of the 
total employment in the Czech Republic, compared to 55-65% in the other Visegrad 
countries. In terms of private sector development, the voucher method of privatization in 
the Czech Republic succeeded because it helped the country overcome its backwardness 
in terms of private sector development in comparison with the other Visegrad countries. 
4. Enterprise Ownership Structure  
There was widely known that the voucher method would lead to dispersed 
ownership. The ownership concentration process that followed the voucher privatization 
was successful because it resulted in ownership concentration similar to the United 
Kingdom. However, the transparency of ownership concentration was a failure.  
Approximately 72% of all points were placed into IPFs during the first wave. The 
thirteen largest IPFs gained 56% of all points invested in the IPFs. After bidding, 66% of 
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all shares ended up in IPFs hands.233 The greater concentration of ownership during 
voucher privatization was a positive development. In the Czech Republic, the IPFs played 
an important role in ownership concentration. There were less severe restrictions on 
corporate ownership and control. IPFs could invest up to 10% of their assets in a single 
company and could hold up to 20% of the equity of a company compared to a limit of 
around 5% in the EU.  
Individuals that wanted to take advantage and convert their shares into cash as 
soon as possible contributed to further ownership concentration. Who was purchasing 
shares? It was those who were interested in the management of the firm such as 
managers, IPFs, and investors. Shafik remarked that individual investors also formed 
shareholder associations.234 The share of strategic investors having more than 30% of 
shares in enterprises increased from only 7% in 1993 to 73% in 1997. The ownership 
concentration in 1997 reached the level similar to the United Kingdom.235 
In Czechoslovakia, large banks were the founders of the largest IPFs. Bank 
sponsored investment funds gained 44% of all coupon points. 236 As a result, banks had 
excessive economic power over firms and could control firms through the shares owned 
by their funds. Banks, as the institutional owners, have monitored the firms’ performance 
but they were not experts in enterprise management in different industry fields. The 
majority of funds did not play an active role in the governance of enterprises. Created 
circumstances, such as a group of funds owning the majority of shares in individual 
firms, forced them to elect their representatives to Supervisory and Management Boards. 
These representatives had to supervise and monitor the management’s performance.237 
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The liberal regulatory framework was marked by lax supervision and a lack of 
protection of the minority shareholder. The perception of the general public is that “the 
process of ownership concentration was accompanied by non-transparent deals and price 
manipulation.”238 Cull, Matesova and Shirley illustrated the presence of two perverse 
behaviors of dominant owners and managers after privatization. First, efforts to acquire 
greater income occurred through borrowing, looting and defaulting instead of through 
profit maximizing efforts. Second, efforts were made to strip assets from privatized firms 
and transfer them to their own firms or accounts. Such conduct was almost guaranteed 
due to the weak protection of minority shareholders, weak enforcement of rules on 
disclosure, virtual government guarantees and dogmatic credit allocation. 239 
5. Emergence of a Competitive Free Market Environment 
During the last decade, the Czech Republic successfully moved from a command 
economy to a consolidated democracy and market economy that failed to implement 
counter measures against corruption.  
The Czech government led by Vaclav Klaus began the transition period with a 
strong commitment to a free market economy and removed regulations in the security 
market where government involvement is usually seen as essential. Despite political 
changes started in 1997, the government was slow in enhancing transparency, 
accountability and creating clear principles for its intervention in the economy. There are 
still doubts about the security of property rights. Crime and corruption are their most 
serious obstacles to free competition. 240  
An EBRD and World Bank survey revealed that the average bribe as a percentage 
of the annual revenue of the firms reached 4.5% in the Czech Republic compared to 3.7% 
in Slovakia, 3.5% in Hungary and 2.5% in Poland. In contrast, the percentage of firms 
frequently bribing or worse was more favorable for the Czech Republic. About 26.3% of 
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firms pay bribes in the Czech Republic compared to 31.3% in Hungary, 32.7% in Poland 
and 34.6% in Slovakia.241  
The Czech Republic was ranked 42 out of 99 countries surveyed in Transparency 
International’s 2000 Corruption Perceptions Index and received a score of 4.2. Since the 
start of the transition process, only a very few anti corruption measures were 
implemented in the Czech Republic.  
The government agencies do not have formal codes of conduct. By law, 
the president, government ministers, the heads of both chambers of 
parliament, and other government officials may not participate in private 
business activities. Elected officials may engage in private business 
activities without any limitations. There are no restrictions on the 
participation of family members of government officials in business.242 
From the start of economic reforms, the Czech Republic has made significant 
progress in the emergence of a free market environment. In 1998, Freedom House 
qualified the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary as countries with consolidated 
democracies and market economies.243  
C. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE OUTCOMES  
1. Speed of Privatization 
In terms of speed, the coupon scheme was successful. In contrast, it failed to 
follow its original deadline. First, the major sources of delay were in the preparation and 
review of privatization projects. Second, there was a natural delay in the transfer of 
shares to the new owners caused by the partition of the former Czechoslovakia.244 
Voucher privatization encompassed 1,849 enterprises in the Czech Republic with 
a book value of 375.5 billion CZK. It was a great success compared to 1,670 firms in 
Poland and 1,460 in Hungary. Shafik pointed out that the economic gains from speed are 
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more significant because it reduces the opportunities for asset stripping and spontaneous 
privatization in the transition period.245 
If privatization proceeds rapidly, the cost of current dislocation is quickly 
outweighed by the benefits of efficient use. A slow transition represents 
value of pain, but can increase cost as the private sector adjust to each step 
in the transition process.  Delays in transfer of ownership rights can lead to 
asset stripping by contemporary management.246 
In November 1991, a list of 2,744 medium and large-scale firms selected for the 
first wave was published. Six months later the coupon scheme was prepared, privatization 
projects selected and a list of firms included in the first wave was published. The bidding 
process took longer than expected. It lasted eight months from May to December of 1992. 
The whole cycle took 14 months for 1,491 firms. The second wave that involved 867 
enterprises started in early 1994 and was successfully completely in March 1995.  
2. Transparency  
The transparency of the voucher scheme was critical for gaining wide public 
support and participation in vouchers. However, the implementation of the voucher 
method lacked transparency. The least transparent parts of the coupon scheme were 
criticized for unfairness. First, the review and subjective evaluation of privatization 
proposals left room for favoritism. Second, price setting by the price committee was 
criticized because the auction method forced bidders to invest in overpriced shares. Third, 
the discriminatory pricing rule was criticized for allowing the sale of shares of some 
enterprises at different prices. Fourth, some people were left with unused points at the 
end of the fifth round of bidding. The voucher system was not able to transfer all shares. 
Fewer than 2% of coupon points were not transformed into shares.247  
3. Distribution for Free  
Critics of the free distribution of state assets assumed that it will not give new 
owners incentives to manage freely acquired property, will lead to the immediate sale of 
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the shares and increased consumption of goods, and as a result, will unleash 
hyperinflation. 
Kyn illustrated that this anxiety is exaggerated and could result in a mild increase 
in inflation, which could be prevented by a restrictive monetary policy. 248 However, the 
results turned out better than expected. When the transfer of shares was completed only 
about 7 to 15% of the participants decided to sell shares immediately. When people 
cashed out shares to funds after one year, they were worth much more than they received. 
A sudden increase in the supply of shares in the market temporarily reduced the market 
price of the shares. About 53% of the participants kept all their shares and 19% of the 
participants sold their shares.249 
Kyn argues that by exchanging shares for vouchers, enterprises will not acquire 
additional capital because the new capital for firms is acquired on primary financial 
markets when savings are used to purchase newly issued equity. Privatization is a form of 
an exchange of shares for vouchers or their sale for money. Privatization  
is similar to secondary financial markets, where only changes in the 
owners of the existing capital take place. Even when the shares are sold 
for money, the newly privatized firm receives nothing, because all the 
proceeds from privatization go to the former owner, i.e. the State.250 
4. Access to Information 
The voucher method of privatization failed to provide symmetric information for 
participants. Unofficial sources of information and prior knowledge about a firm’s 
performance played a significant role in the first two rounds of bidding. Shafik has 
empirical evidence that, in the first two rounds of bidding, public information about the 
past performance of firms was important because private information about the firms was 
not revealed.251 In the last rounds, asymmetric information played a decreasing role 
because bidders learned from the bidding ways of others. 
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On the one hand, the government actually provided information about enterprises 
to the public. The Center for Coupon Privatization published an investor guide for 
bidders to place their coupons but also warned the bidders about data quality and 
relevancy due to the rapidly changing economic environment. In addition, the bidders had 
an opportunity to use public information issued in newspapers.  
On the other hand, they allowed the market to interpret the data. Judgment was 
left to the wisdom of the coupon holders. “The fact that some people did have ‘insider 
information’ about the true value of some enterprises was not considered a systemic bias, 
particularly since such privileged information would often be revealed in the bidding 
process.“252 The bidding results showed that the public used the information provided by 
the government, because in bidding, participants preferred popular firms with high 
profits. In addition, informal sources of information played a role. Shafik has evidence 
that there was a large portion of sold shares for which the price determination could not 
be explained by published information alone.253  
5. Fairness 
How fair was privatization itself? The voucher method was considered unfair as 
well as the resultant outcomes. First, the voucher method led to an unequal distribution of 
state assets to eligible citizens. Some of the participants received less value for their 
coupons than did others. The average accounting value of assets per book in the first 
wave was 35,000. However, those who invested in the investment funds had an 
opportunity to gain 2,000-15,000 CZK. Individual investors tended to be more educated 
and wealthier. For the less wealthy and educated, it was a means to earn a short-term 
profit (2,000-3,000 CZK). 
Second, the privatization of insolvent enterprises contributed to the criticism of 
the voucher method. The insolvent firms had to advance with privatization that caused 
some individuals and IPFs to obtain worthless shares. Although the actua l losses incurred 
by shareholders were small as they paid only a nominal fee of 1,000 CZK per coupon 
book, it negatively affected political support for privatization and the government’s 
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credibility.254 Thus, the government, instead of excluding or liquidating the non-
profitable parts of enterprises, allowed insolvent firms to participate in the voucher 
privatization.  
Third, although individual bidders gained from privatization, the winners were the 
investment funds. It was clear that asymmetric information played an important role in 
privatization. 255 
6. Equity 
The unique auction system used in voucher privatization was designed to 
overcome limitations such as (a) a domestic financial market that was underdeveloped, 
(b) a lack of useful assets pricing signals, and (c) a lack of appropriately trained analysts 
for enterprise evaluation. Harper demonstrated evidence about pricing and equity 
distribution during voucher privatization. He examined the determinants of the share 
pricing system used for the auction of shares in the Czech Republic. The resultant 
document shows that share valuation and demand in the auction were based on 
characteristic such as (a) return on sales, (b) sales growth, and (c) ownership structure. 
While share prices undershoot or overshoot in the early rounds, they get close to 
equilibrium in the last rounds of bidding.256   
The objective of equity was achieved by establishing a process that was 
largely transparent and created a level playing field for all potential buyers 
of shares through the coupon scheme. There was no systematic bias in 
share allocations in favor of "insiders" (either management or workers).257 
7. Role of Investment Funds  
a. The Positive Results 
The first positive outcome of the voucher method was the initial 
appearance of privatization funds. More than 400 funds were established in the voucher 
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privatization process. This situation boosted opportunities for the development of free 
market competition. The second positive outcome was that approximately 72% of all 
points were placed into IPFs in the first wave and 64% in the second wave. These results 
had a positive outcome on ownership concentration.  
Shafik predicted that IPFs would play a key role in enterprise restructuring 
and will be under enormous pressure to fulfill their promises of quick returns and to 
distribute dividends to shareholders. He warns that it may result in decisions weakening 
long term restructuring and jeopardizing minority shareholders.258  
The Czech government hesitated and moved slowly in the implementation 
of regulations for investment funds.  
To reduce self dealing and conflict of interest when a fund buys or sells 
shares, the Czech and Slovak Republics require that the price paid for 
shares must be no higher than the current market price and the price 
received for shares must be no lower the current market price.259 
b. The Undesirable Results  
The Czech Republic did not learn from U.S. history that regulation of 
investment funds is essential. At the beginning of a privatization process, strict rules 
about information disclosure and penalties for fraud and misappropriation are essential 
because unethical administrators of funds appear and try to benefit at the expense of 
small investors.260 As a result of loose regulatory measures, some funds started to loot or 
tunnel261 assets from privatized firms.262  
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Funds could employ four types of undesirable behavior during privatization: 
monopolization, shrinking, self-dealing and high-risk investments.263  
· Monopolization. A fund may acquire controlling ownership in several 
firms from the same industry or market and later influence them to move 
from competition to cooperation 
· Shrinking.  Fund and company managers may shrink their responsibilities 
and allow the shareholders value reduction on behalf of the funds assets 
· Self-dealing. Fund managers make themselves richer or support the 
interests of others on behalf of the fund shareholders 
· High-risk investments. Fund managers are engaged in high-risk 
investment strategies 
Cull, Matesova and Shirley provided empirical evidence that the fund-controlled 
joint stock companies under-performed all other firms such as foreign-owned joint stock 
companies, domestic joint stock companies not controlled by funds and limited liability 
companies, and took liabilities at a faster rate than other firms. This fund-governance 
failure can be explained by the existence of looting. They stress that the performance of 
fund-controlled joint stock companies in 1996 was considerably worse than in 1993-
1994.264 
Anderson in 1994 praised Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping as an example of a 
successful enterprise. After the first wave of privatization, four funds owned more than 
50% of the company and 30% remained in the state-owned firm FINOP. When the funds 
took over control they started to look for short-term gains. In contrast, managers 
preferred long-term growth and an expansion strategy. 265 The end result was a disaster 
for this profitable enterprise.  
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Privatization became the keystone for stabilization and transformation. It was the 
most observed and complicated part of the stabilization and transformation process. The 
Czech government used an unique privatization method to (a) speed up privatization 
because the private sector was almost non-existent (b) distribute a significant part of state 
owned assets for free to gain greater public support for transformation (c) destroy the 
communist institutional order and (d) create political and economic stability.  
The coupon privatization method fit in the radical strategy of transition from a 
command economy to a free market economy. In two waves, from October 1991 to 
March 1995, 1,810 state-owned enterprises were privatized. The government committed 
about 300 billion CZK of state owned assets to the first wave and 155 billion CZK to the 
second wave. Public participation in the first wave reached 75% of all eligible citizens 
and 80% in the second wave. Approximately 353 investment funds emerged during both 
waves. The percentage of shares allocated to funds decreased from 72.5% to 64%. The 
ten largest funds established by domestic financial institutions controlled 23.6% of the 
privatized assets.  
At the end of the voucher privatization process, the private sector encompassed 
66.5% of the economy compared to 65% in Hungary, 62% in Slovakia and 59% in 
Poland. However, the government still kept its majority shares or stakes in large and 
strategic corporations and postponed the privatization of the banking sector. Various 
restrictions hindered the entry of foreign investors due to the awareness of the cheap sale 
off of attractive state assets.  
The start of privatization was more favorable for Poland and Hungary that 
preferred a gradual pace of transition. Both countries first restructured the state owned 
enterprises then privatized them. The Polish approach was based on the adoption of 
traditional time-consuming methods of privatization. By the end of 1995, privatization 
had started in 3,515 enterprises and was completed in 1,670 out of 8,441 enterprises 
devoted to privatization. In the early years of the trans ition process, Poland generated 
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relatively low revenue from privatization but this significantly increased as the 
privatization process advanced.   
In Hungary, which preferred the sale of assets rather than distribution for free, the 
privatization of state enterprises advanced very slowly. However, the privatization 
process dramatically accelerated in 1995. By the end of 1995, the privatization revenue 
mainly acquired from foreign investors amounted to HUF 917 billion. Even so, the state 
retained its majority stakes in 441 enterprises. Among them, 24 were considered as 
strategic with a value of HUF 1,007 billion.  
Findings disapprove that there was a Czech economic miracle because the 
macroeconomic performance of the Czech Republic was to some extent similar to that of 
other Visegrad countries. Within the last decade, the Czech government outperformed its 
neighbors in terms of lower inflation, a more balanced current account and 
unemployment until1998. In contrast, the growth rate and direct foreign investment were 
less favorable for the Czech Republic. From the lowest level of economic growth, 
achieved from the beginning of the transition process to 1998, the Polish economy grew 
by 42.5% of the GDP compared to 32.9% in Slovakia, 16.2% in Hungary and 12.7% in 
the Czech Republic. Industrial restructuring hardly occurred during the last decade and 
has not reached the previous level of 1990. During 1991-1997, Hungary received the 
greatest inflow of direct foreign investments mainly from privatization.  
The success in liberalization and small-scale privatization helped the Czech and 
Slovak Republics to reach the same level as Poland and Hungary by the end of 1992. 
Since then no significant differences have appeared among them. The Czech Republic 
experienced the fastest growing private sector among the Visegrad countries, and mainly 
as a result of the faster pace of privatization. By the end of 1995, the private sector 
comprised 66.5% of the economy compared to 65% in Hungary, 62% in Slovakia and 
59% in Poland. During 1989-1995, employment in the Czech private sector grew from 
16% in 1989 to 75.5%. In 1995, private sector employment in Slovakia grew to 55%, in 
Hungary to 65% and in Poland to 66% of total employment. 
At the end of 2000, the Hungarian government completed the privatization 
process but retained its ownership in 175 enterprises with a value of HUF 800 billion, 
93 
while 1,230 were privatized and 740 closed down. In contrast, in Poland, by the end of 
2001, the number of state owned enterprises was still high at 2,054. In 106 enterprises, 
the Polish government retained more than 50% of the shares. Privatization in Poland by 
traditional methods proved to be successful in terms of completed privatization, reliable 
corporate governance and good economic performance. The Polish government expects 
privatization to be completed by the end of 2002.  
Implementation of the voucher method helped the Czech Republic rapidly 
progress in the privatization of state-owned assets. In contrast, bank privatization 
proceeded slowly.  At the end of 1997, the value of privatized assets accounted for CZK 
700 billion. The state’s share in the banking sector accounted for 84% of the banking 
sector. A large amount of strategic assets are still to be privatized. In 1999, the Czech 
government accelerated structural reforms and privatization. At the end of June 2001, 
privatization of the banking sector was completed.   
How successful was voucher privatization? First, the coupon method was 
successful in meeting the Czech government’s objectives. It was successful in (a) the fast 
transformation of property rights from the state to private owners, (b) gaining wide pubic 
support for privatization, and (c) preventing foreigners from dominating the privatization 
process. However, it failed to improve the performance and governance of privatized 
enterprises.  
Second, the voucher method was successful in meeting some of the objectives 
recognized by liberal economists. It was successful in (a) private sector development, (b) 
emergence of ownership concentration similar to the United Kingdom, and (c) 
transformation from a command economy to consolidated market economy. In contrast, it 
failed (a) to maximize revenue collection from privatization, (b) because it had a mainly 
negative impact on efficiency in privatized firms due to delayed structural reforms, and 
(c) to implement counter measures against corruption.  
Third, the coupon method was successful in (a) in terms of the speed of 
denationalization (b) the free distribution of state assets that did not unleash 
hyperinflation, (c) developing a good system for equity distribution, and (d) the 
emergence of a large number of privatization funds. However, it failed (a) to follow its 
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original deadline, (b) to create regulatory measures against looting, tunneling and other 
undesirable behavior (c) to provide asymmetric information to participants, (d) to be fair 
as far as the resultant outcomes were concerned, and (e) because it lacked transparency.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
What is to be learned from this research? First, the radical privatization method 
helps to speed up privatization but leaves the structural reforms to the new owners. 
Second, direct sale methods bring a significant inflow of foreign direct investments. 
Third, the population favors more distribution of state assets than sales to foreign 
investors. Fourth, the implementation of the voucher method does not significantly 
impact macroeconomic performance. Fifth, delays in bank privatization extend the 
influence of the state in newly privatized enterprises and delays the structural reforms in 
privatized companies.  
Although the voucher privatization method failed to fulfill some of the objectives 
recognized by government and liberal economists, it was demonstrated to be not only a 
theoretical construct but also a practical device for denationalization. It illustrated that (a) 
it is possible to convert a large amount of state assets to private hands in a short period of 
time (b) it could gain wide public support from participants and (c) it enabled a 
government to speed up the transition process.  
There were, however, some limitations to the voucher method in the Czech 
Republic. For those countries interested in trying to implement this method it is necessary 
(a) to restructure less viable state-owned enterprises (b) to create regulatory measures 
against looting, tunneling and other undesirable behavior (c) to focus more on profit 
maximization (d) to enable wider participation by foreign investors, and (e) to implement 
standard bankruptcy procedures.  
Although the implementation of the voucher method was criticized, it was a real 
challenge for the Czech government. First, the private sector was almost non-existent. 
Second, it was a new approach to privatization. Third, a new inexperienced government 
implemented it. Fourth, there was no previous experience with such a large transfer of 
state assets. Fifth, foreign advisors were inexperienced and had limited advice available 
as to what to do and how to do it.  
95 
Privatization was the most observed and complicated part of the stabilization and 
transformation process in the Visegrad countries. It was difficult to accomplish but it was 
extremely powerful in destroying the prior institutional order. The rapid as well as 
moderate pace of privatization produced the expected results. It showed that the process 
of implementation might play a more significant role than the implemented method itself. 
The following are some recommendations for further research. For a better 
understanding of privatization in Eastern Europe, it would be beneficial to examine (a) 
the effects of privatization on income distribution (b) the effects of corruption on 
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